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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Shubin Xu
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Decision Sciences
June 2012
Title: Essays in Operations and Supply Chain Management
This dissertation is based on three essays in operations and supply chain management.
In essay 1, we study an operations scheduling problem in a complex manufacturing
system, most notably, semiconductor manufacturing. In particular, we study the scheduling
problem of minimizing total weighted tardiness on parallel non-identical batch processing
machines. We formulate the (primal) problem as a nonlinear integer programming model.
Moreover, we prove that the primal problem can be solved exactly by solving a corresponding
dual problem with nonlinear relaxation. Since both the primal and the dual problems are
NP-hard, we propose to use genetic algorithms, based on random keys and multiple choice
encodings, to heuristically solve them. We found that the genetic algorithms consistently
outperform a standard mathematical programming package in terms of solutions and
computation times. We also found that for small scale problem instances, the multiple choice
genetic algorithm outperforms the random keys genetic algorithm, while for medium and large
scale problem instances, the random keys genetic algorithm outperforms the multiple choice
genetic algorithm.
In essay 2, we study a monopolist firm offering successive versions of a durable good (e.g.,
software) that improves over time. The firm decides the time between successive introductions
as well as price. In turn, consumers strategically decide whether to purchase or wait for a later
version. We model and analyze three alternative strategies for offering successive product
iv
versions: the partial-, continuous-, and no-updates policies. We first consider the firm’s profit
maximizing policy assuming a homogeneous market and subsequently address consumers with
heterogeneous product valuations. Our analytic model’s simple structure and results highlight
the important tradeoff between price and release timing for products with successive versions.
In essay 3, we study the effect of time series structure of customer demand models on the
value of information sharing within a supply chain. We contribute to the literature by
incorporating a nonlinear demand model based on exponential disturbances, coupled with
temporal heteroscedasticity, which captures more complex patterns in the demand process. We
examine the conditions under which information sharing is valuable.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three essays in operations and supply chain management.
In essay 1, which is Chapter II: Operations Scheduling in a Complex Manufacturing
System, we study the scheduling problem of minimizing total weighted tardiness on parallel
non-identical batch processing machines. This research is motivated by burn-in oven test
operations in semiconductor fabrication. In burn-in test, different kinds of IC chips are loaded
onto boards and then placed into an oven for burn-in test. Due to the limited capacity of the
burn-in oven, the IC chips must be grouped into batches. All chips in a batch start and finish
processing at the same time. The burn-in ovens can be modeled as parallel batch processing
machines with non-identical capacities. The performance metric of the scheduling system is
total weighted tardiness, which can be regarded as a surrogate for the on-time delivery
performance of a firm. This batch scheduling is known to be NP-hard. It is widely believed that
there are no polynomial-time algorithms for NP-hard problems. We first formulate the (primal)
scheduling problem as a nonlinear integer programming model. Moreover, we prove that the
primal problem can be solved exactly by solving a corresponding dual problem with nonlinear
relaxation. Since both the dual and the primal problems are NP-hard, we propose to use genetic
algorithms, based on multiple choice and random keys encodings, to heuristically solve them
within a reasonable amount of computation times. Through extensive computational
experiments, we find that both the multiple choice and the random keys genetic algorithms
consistently outperform the standard mathematical programming package in term of solutions
and computation times. We also find that for small scale problem instances, the multiple choice
genetic algorithm outperforms the random keys genetic algorithm, while for medium and large
scale problem instances, the random keys genetic algorithm outperforms the multiple choice
genetic algorithm.
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In essay 2, which is Chapter III: Pricing and Timing Successive Product Releases, we study
a monopolist firm selling successive versions of an improvable durable good. The firm decides
the time between successive introductions as well as price. In turn, consumers strategically
decide whether to purchase or wait for a later version. This research was motivated by the
observation in software industry. We observe that, on average, every two to three years,
Microsoft releases a new version of Windows or Office software package. We observe the similar
software release pattern for Adobe Acrobat, an application software package to view, create,
manipulate, and manage files in Portable Document Format (PDF), the de facto standard for
the secure and reliable distribution and exchange of electronic documents. We try to
understand what are the drivers in determining the release frequency and the price.
In our model, we assume that the product technology has a steady (constant, exogenous)
rate of improvement over time. We also allow for post-purchase product updates. Starting with
homogeneous consumers, we model and analyze three polices for offering successive product
versions: the partial-, continuous-, and no-updates policies. The continuous- and no-updates
policies are the limiting cases of the partial-updates policy. We find that although price and
profit depend on the rate of technology improvement, the monopolist’s optimal pace of product
introductions does not. We show that the key driver of the optimal time between successive
products is the discount rate. We compare the limiting cases of the no-updates policy and the
continuous-updates policy (“subscription selling”), and show that the latter optimally yields
higher profits but requires a lengthy subscription interval or a high discount rate. We also show
that ideally (if feasible), the monopolist would sell a “lifetime” (infinite) subscription with free
updates and so extract all surplus from consumers, resulting in a profit level nearly triple of that
from selling individual models without updates. Given that the limiting case of pure
subscription may be unrealistic in practice, we consider a hybrid strategy (i.e., the
partial-updates policy) of offering new models that provide some front-loaded performance
gains along with limited post-purchase updates. We show that by offering new models earlier in
time, with smaller initial performance increments, and then subsequently delivering updates
over time, the monopolist increases profits relative to a no-updates policy.
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We then extend the analysis to address heterogeneous consumers. We assume that
consumers are heterogeneous in product valuation. Consumers self-select their upgrade
frequencies based on their product valuations. High valuation customers will continue to
purchase every new release, whereas others may purchase only every other (or every third, etc.)
version, thus skipping over some releases. Consumer “skipping” and the resultant disparate
purchase frequencies significantly complicates the firm’s decision problem, even given a
constant launch interval. We derive a bound on the firm’s optimal profit. Given a heterogeneous
customer base, we use that bound to analyze the firm’s policy and demonstrate that when
determining the product launch interval, the firm can achieve near-optimal profits by focusing
exclusively on relatively high valuation customers—specifically, those who are expected to
purchase at least every other model. We even find that if the firm sets the launch interval by
specifically targeting only the consumer segment with highest product valuation (i.e., the
consumers who are expected to purchase each new version, as in the homogeneous setting),
the resulting profit loss is not severe provided that the front-loaded performance gain is high
(e.g., over 70% initial performance gain). This robustness highlights the importance of the
insights derived from the simpler homogeneous-consumer case.
In essay 3, which is Chapter IV: Value of Information Sharing in a Supply Chain, we study
the effect of time series structure of customer demand models on the value of information
sharing within a supply chain. The topic of the value of information sharing in a multistage
supply chain has been studied extensively. Most of these studies assume that the customer
demand follows a homogeneous Gaussian process. We contribute to the literature by
considering a nonlinear demand process based on exponential disturbances, coupled with
temporal heteroscedasticity. Under such demand settings, we consider three models based on
the information sharing scheme in a two-stage supply chain with one manufacturer and one
retailer: Model 1: the retailer shares the demand information with the manufacturer; Model 2:
the retailer does not share the demand information with the manufacturer, and the
manufacturer uses the entire order history from the retailer to forecast the leadtime demand;
Model 3: the retailer does not share the demand information with the manufacturer, and the
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manufacturer uses only the most recent orders from the retailer to forecast the leadtime
demand. For each model, we quantify the variance of the leadtime demand. We show
analytically that when the customer demand exhibits temporal heteroscedasticity, both the
retailer and the manufacturer would expect larger variance in the leadtime demand, regardless
of whether the demand is autocorrelated. In Model 2, we find that there is no value of
information sharing in any given time period, while in Model 3, we find that temporal
heteroscedasticity by itself does not increase the value of information sharing unless the
demand is autocorrelated over time. Analytical results show that sharing demand information
can lead to a 10% to 80% variance reduction in the manufacturer’s leadtime demand, and hence
in the manufacturer’s safety stock level when demand exhibits strong autocorrelation and
temporal heteroscedasticity.
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CHAPTER II
OPERATIONS SCHEDULING IN A COMPLEX MANUFACTURING SYSTEM
II.1. Introduction
Growing competition in the global marketplace has brought new challenges for
manufacturing companies. Many companies focus on the competitive priority of on-time
delivery for their processes. They keep looking for better ways to schedule jobs on critical or
bottleneck equipment in order to meet delivery-time promises. In this chapter, we study
operations scheduling in a complex manufacturing system, most notably, semiconductor
manufacturing. Today’s digital world has seen extensive use of integrated circuits (also referred
to as ICs, chips, or microchips) in automobiles, computers, cell phones, appliances, and
virtually all electronic equipment. These ICs are manufactured in semiconductor fabrication
plants (commonly called fabs). A typical fab has several hundred extremely expensive
processing tools, each of which can cost millions of U.S. dollars. And the cost of building a new
fab could be easily over one billion U.S. dollars, with values as high as $3–5 billion not being
uncommon. For example, Intel invested $2.5 billion on its first 300 mm wafer fab (called Fab 68,
which was opened in 2010) in China,1 and it announced plans to invest more than $5 billion to
build a new wafer fab in Arizona (Fab 42, the construction of which is expected to be completed
in 2013).2 Due to the multi-billion dollar investments and brief product life cycle, long term
capacity decision for a fab is critical (Pangburn and Sundaresan 2009). In this chapter, we study
operations scheduling after the initial capacity investments are completed.
1Source: http://www.intel.com/jobs/china/sites/dalian.htm. Accessed: April 20, 2012.
2Source: http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4213295/Intel-to-build-new-Arizona-fab-.
Accessed: April 20, 2012.
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With the advance in chip manufacturing technologies, ICs have become more and more
standardized. This standardization allows design to be split from manufacturing. Because of
the high entry barriers and the separation of manufacturing and design, a new business model,
called fabless model, emerged in the 1980s. A fabless semiconductor company specializes in
the design of microelectronics devices and chips, which are then outsourced to a specialized
manufacturer (called foundry) for fabrication. Foundries have become the cornerstone of the
fabless model. Due to the huge capital investments, large volumes of chips are produced. The
goal is to spread the costs and take advantage of economies of scale. In a wafer fab, equipment
failure is very costly. It causes unexpected downtime and usually destroys an entire wafer lot with
value of $100,000 to $1,000,000.3 To minimize the downtime, multiple copies of each equipment
type are operated in parallel. Because of the standardization of the fabrication processes, the
foundries (or fabs, for that matter) are essentially competing on the same product line. As a
result of the Moore’s Law, fast improvements in chip performance quickly render predecessor
technologies “obsolete.” Therefore, meeting customers’ due dates becomes very important for a
chip manufacturer, since otherwise customers will turn to other manufacturers (competitors).
There are four major steps in IC manufacturing: wafer fabrication, wafer probe, assembly
or packaging, and final testing (Uzsoy et al. 1992). Burn-in test operation take place in the final
testing step. The processing times of burn-in operation are generally extremely long compared
to those of other testing operations, e.g., 120 hours vs. 4–5 hours (Lee et al. 1992). Therefore, the
burn-in operation is frequently the bottleneck in the final testing step. And because it occurs
at the end of the manufacturing process, it is critical to the company’s commitment of on-time
delivery of finished products. Effective scheduling of burn-in operations is of great importance
to the overall performance of a semiconductor manufacturing company.
In the burn-in test, different kinds of IC chips are loaded onto boards and then placed into
an oven for burn-in test. The oven is maintained at a constant high temperature for an
extended period of time. The burn-in time and temperature for each IC chip are determined by
3Source: http://www.dmcplus.com/publication_files/symsys_higherprofits.pdf. Accessed: April 20,
2012.
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the product test specification and thus are known a priori. The purpose of burn-in test is to
expose the IC chips to thermal stress so that any chip out of test specification can be sorted out.
Due to the limited capacity of the burn-in oven, the IC chips must be grouped into batches. All
chips (jobs) in a batch start and finish processing at the same time. To ensure the quality of the
product, the processing time of a batch is determined by the longest processing time of all the
chips contained in the batch. A chip can be kept in the oven longer than its pre-specified
burn-in time, but not taken out from the oven before the pre-specified burn-in time has
elapsed. Once the processing of a batch starts, it cannot be preempted and no chip can be
removed from or introduced to the oven until the processing of the entire batch is completed.
We model the burn-in ovens as parallel batch processing machines with non-identical
capacities. IC chips have dynamic arrival times (i.e., not all jobs are ready for processing at time
zero)4 and different processing times. The on-time delivery performance of an IC chip
manufacturing company can be measured by the total weighted tardiness (TWT), defined as
TWT :=∑w j T j , where the weight w j represents the priority of job j relative to the other jobs in
the system, and T j is the tardiness of job j . Following the notation in Pinedo (2002), we denote
this scheduling problem as Rm |r j ,batch |∑w j T j , where Rm stands for m unrelated parallel
machines, i.e., machines that can process different jobs at different rates, and r j denotes the
release time (or ready time) of job j . A batch processing machine can process from one up to
K ≥ 2 jobs at a time, where K is the maximum batch size. Scheduling of batch processing
machines can be very hard. Given n jobs to be scheduled on a single batch processing machine,
Brucker et al. (1998) showed that 1 |batch |∑w j T j is strongly NP-hard when 2≤ K < n. Adding
non-identical parallel batch processing machines and dynamic job arrival times further
complicates the already NP-hard scheduling problem. Therefore, our scheduling problem of
minimizing total weighted tardiness on parallel non-identical batch processing machines is
also NP-hard. It is widely believed that there are no polynomial-time algorithms for NP-hard
problems. We first formulate the (primal) scheduling problem as a nonlinear integer
programming model. Moreover, we prove that the primal problem can be solved exactly by
4By contrast, static job arrival times means that all jobs are available for processing at time zero.
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solving a corresponding dual problem with nonlinear relaxation. Since both the dual and the
primal problems are NP-hard, we propose to use genetic algorithms, based on multiple choice
and random keys encodings, to heuristically solve them within a reasonable amount of
computation times. Through extensive computational experiments, we find that both the
multiple choice and the random keys genetic algorithms consistently outperform a standard
mathematical programming package in term of solutions and computation times. We also find
that for small scale problem instances, the multiple choice genetic algorithm outperforms the
random keys genetic algorithm, while for medium and large scale problem instances, the
random keys genetic algorithm outperforms the multiple choice genetic algorithm.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section II.2, we review previous research
efforts that focus on scheduling batch processing machines. In Section II.3, we propose a
mathematical formulation of the problem and present a baseline approach using a standard
mathematical programming package. In Section II.4, we present some mathematical tools that
will be used in constructing the dual problem. In Section II.5, we propose to use genetic
algorithms to heuristically solve the problem. Computational results are given in Section II.6.
Finally, Section II.7 concludes. All proofs are presented in Appendix A.
II.2. Literature Review
Early work on batch scheduling problem focus on single machine. Ikura and Gimple
(1986) studied a single batch processing machine with identical job processing times and
identical job sizes. Lee et al. (1992) studied the problem of scheduling semiconductor burn-in
operations. They presented dynamic programming based algorithms for minimizing a number
of performance measures such as maximum tardiness, the number of tardy jobs, on a single
batch processing machine. Chandru et al. (1993b) studied the problem of minimizing total
completion time on single and parallel identical batch processing machines. They proposed an
exact branch-and-bound algorithm for the single machine scheduling problem and heuristics
for the parallel machines scheduling problem. Chandru et al. (1993a) also proposed a dynamic
programming algorithm for minimizing total completion time on a single batch processing
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machine. Uzsoy (1994) studied the problem of scheduling a single batch processing machine
with non-identical job sizes. He developed a branch-and-bound algorithm as well as heuristics
to minimize total completion time. Uzsoy (1995) studied another problem of scheduling batch
processing machines with incompatible job families, where jobs from different families cannot
be grouped into the same batch. He developed several algorithms to minimize makespan,
maximum lateness and total weighted completion time for single and parallel identical batch
processing machines. Mehta and Uzsoy (1998) studied the problem of minimizing total
tardiness on a batch processing machine with incompatible job families. They provided a
dynamic programming algorithm that has polynomial time complexity when the number of job
families and the capacity of the batch processing machine are fixed. They also examined a
number of heuristics that can provide near optimal solutions in a reasonable amount of
computation time. Lee and Uzsoy (1999) considered the scheduling problem of minimizing
makespan on a single batch processing machine with dynamic job arrivals. They provided
polynomial and pseudo-polynomial time algorithms for several special cases. They also
developed efficient heuristics and evaluated their performance through computational
experiments. Sung and Choung (2000) studied the scheduling problem to minimize makespan
for a single burn-in oven. They analyzed a static problem in which all jobs are ready at time
zero, and also investigated a dynamic problem with different job ready times. They proposed a
branch-and-bound algorithm and a number of heuristics to solve the scheduling problem.
Chang et al. (2004) proposed a simulated annealing approach to minimize makespan for
parallel identical batch processing machines. Xu and Bean (2007) proposed a random keys
genetic algorithm to minimize makespan for parallel non-identical batch processing machines
with static job arrivals, in which all jobs are available for processing at time zero. Kurz and
Mason (2008) developed the Batch Improvement Algorithm to minimize total weighted
tardiness on a single batch processing machine with incompatible job families and job ready
times. Li et al. (2011) studied a single machine batch scheduling problem, with each job’s
processing time an increasing simple linear function of its starting time. They presented
polynomial algorithms to minimize the makespan.
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This research differs from Xu and Bean (2007) in the following dimensions. First, we
consider dynamic job arrivals, whereas Xu and Bean considered static job arrivals. Second, we
consider the total weighted tardiness metric, whereas Xu and Bean considered the makespan
metric. Generally, scheduling problem with total weighted tardiness metric is more difficult
than that with makespan metric. Third, based on the problem structure, we consider random
keys and multiple choice genetic algorithms to heuristically solve the problem, whereas Xu and
Bean considered only the random keys genetic algorithm.
II.3. Model Formulation
The batch scheduling problem under study involves assigning jobs to batches and
determining the batch sequences on the machines so as to minimize the total weighted
tardiness. We make the following assumptions about the problem:
(1) There are J jobs to be processed by M parallel non-identical batch processing machines. J
and M are positive integers.
(2) All the data, such as job processing times, job sizes, and machine capacities are deterministic
and known a priori.
(3) Jobs have dynamic arrival times, i.e., not all jobs are ready for processing at time zero.
(4) Machines are continuously available.
(5) The setup times of the machines, compared with the processing times, are negligible.
(6) The processing time of a batch is represented by the longest processing time of all the jobs
contained in the batch. The size of the batch cannot exceed the capacity of the machine.
(7) Once a batch is processed by a machine, it cannot be interrupted, i.e., no preemption is
allowed. No jobs can be introduced or removed from a batch while the batch is being
processed.
(8) Jobs have different weights or priorities. The weight of a job reflects the importance of the
job relative to the other jobs in the system.
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(9) The performance measure for the scheduling system is total weighted tardiness (TWT). Our
objective is to minimize the TWT.
The scheduling problem can be formulated as a nonlinear integer programming model.
With a slight abuse of notation, we let the symbol J denote both the number of jobs and the set
of jobs. Similarly, we let the symbol B denote both the number of batches and the set of batches
formed on each machine. This notational simplification also applies to the symbol M . Below is
a list of notation for the model.
Sets and Indexes:
J Set of jobs.
M Set of machines.
B Set of batches.
j Index of job, j ∈ {1, . . . , J }.
m Index of machine, m ∈ {1, . . . , M }.
b Index of batch, b ∈ {1, . . . ,B}.
Parameters:
Km Capacity of machine m.
s j Size of job j .
w j Weight (priority) of job j .
p j Processing time of job j . Assume that it does not depend on machine m.
r j Ready time of job j . It is the earliest time when job j can start its processing.
d j Due time of job j . It represents the time of committed shipping or completion.
Variables:
x j m[b] Binary, 1 if job j is assigned to batch b and processed by machine m, 0 otherwise.
Rm[b] Ready time of batch b processed by machine m.
Pm[b] Batch processing time of batch b processed by machine m.
c j Completion time of job j .
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Cm[b] Completion time of batch b processed by machine m.
T j Tardiness of job j .
The underlying batch scheduling problem can be formulated as the following nonlinear
integer programming model, denoted by (OP ).
(OP ) min
x
∑
j∈J
w j T j (II.1)
subject to:
∑
j∈J
s j x j m[b] ≤Km ∀m ∈M ,b ∈B (II.2)
∑
m∈M
∑
b∈B
x j m[b] = 1 ∀ j ∈ J (II.3)
Pm[b] ≥ p j x j m[b] ∀ j ∈ J ,m ∈M ,b ∈B (II.4)
Rm[b] ≥ r j x j m[b] ∀ j ∈ J ,m ∈M ,b ∈B (II.5)
Cm[b] ≥Cm[b−1]+Pm[b] ∀m ∈M ,b ∈B (II.6)
Cm[b] ≥Rm[b]+Pm[b] ∀m ∈M ,b ∈B (II.7)
c j ≥Cm[b]x j m[b] ∀ j ∈ J ,m ∈M ,b ∈B (II.8)
T j ≥ c j −d j ∀ j ∈ J (II.9)
T j ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ J (II.10)
x j m[b] ∈ {0,1} ∀ j ∈ J ,m ∈M ,b ∈B (II.11)
The objective (II.1) minimizes the total weighted tardiness. Constraint (II.2) specifies that
for each machine m, the capacity of the machine cannot be exceeded when jobs are assigned
to a batch. Constraint (II.3) ensures that job j is assigned to exactly one batch and processed
on one machine. Constraint (II.4) determines the processing time of a batch. The processing
time of a batch is represented by the longest processing time of all the jobs contained in the
batch. Constraint (II.5) determines the time when a batch is ready to be processed. The ready
time of a batch is the longest ready time of all the jobs in the batch. Constraints (II.6) and (II.7)
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determine the completion time of a batch. A batch’s completion time is equal to the maximum
of the completion time of previous batch on the same machine and the ready time of current
batch plus the batch processing time. Constraint (II.8) determine the completion time of each
job. Constraints (II.9) and (II.10) are the definition of tardiness, T j = max{c j − d j ,0}. Finally,
Constraint (II.11) is a binary constraint.
As stated earlier, the scheduling problem under study is NP-hard, which means that the
optimal solution to the problem of any practical size cannot be directly obtained in a
reasonable amount of computation time. Researchers usually try to find near-optimal or “good”
solutions, which can be obtained in a reasonable amount of computation time. In order to find
the near-optimal or “good” solutions, researchers typically use heuristic methods, e.g., batch
apparent tardiness cost (BATC) (Mehta and Uzsoy 1998), or metaheuristic methods, e.g.,
simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick et al. 1983), ant colony optimization (Dorigo 1992), genetic
algorithms (Holland 1975), etc.
To have a sense of how difficult the problem is, we try to solve the nonlinear integer program
(OP ) with a mathematical programming package CPLEX 10.1. This is our baseline approach. In
order to solve the problem with CPLEX, we convert the nonlinear constraint in equation (II.8) to
linear constraint using big-M method:
c j ≥Cm[b]−G
(
1−x j m[b]
) ∀ j ∈ J ,m ∈M ,b ∈B (II.12)
where G is a big number. In our computation, we let G :=max j∈J r j +∑ j∈J p j .
Preliminary experiments show that with some small problem sets (10 jobs, two parallel
non-identical batch processing machines), CPLEX can find an optimal solution within half an
hour. If we increase the number of jobs to 40, CPLEX cannot find an optimal solution within
two hours, which is of little practical value.
Mathematical programming (e.g., the nonlinear integer program that we have formulated)
is an exact method, which means that it can find optimal solutions in theory. But the problem is
that the computation time is often impractically long. Although mathematical programming is
in general not a successful route to finding optimal solutions to combinatorial problems, the
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process of formulation itself is helpful in understanding more precisely the nature of the
problem. For example, if we look at the nonlinear integer program (OP ) more closely, we will
find that constraints (II.3)–(II.11) are just definitional, which are “easy,” and (II.2) is the capacity
constraint, which is “hard.” It is possible to construct a dual problem using some relaxation
methods, such as Lagrangian relaxation and penalty function methods. With the relaxation
methods, we can transform the original problem into an easy one (hopefully) by relaxing the
“hard” constraint(s). In this research, we adopt the nonlinear penalty function methods. The
advantage of the nonlinear penalty function methods over Lagrangian relaxation is that there is
no duality gap. In next section, we introduce the nonlinear penalty function methods for
discrete optimization problems. Subsequently, we will apply the nonlinear penalty function
methods to the nonlinear integer program (OP ) that we have developed for our scheduling
problem.
II.4. Nonlinear Penalty Function Methods
II.4.1. Preliminaries
General optimization problems are difficult to solve. Certain problem classes, e.g., linear
programming and convex optimization problems, can be solved efficiently and reliably (Boyd
and Vandenberghe 2004). Nonlinear programming problem is the optimization problem whose
objective and/or constraints are nonlinear, but they may not be convex. There are no known
effective methods for solving general nonlinear programming problems.
Given a nonlinear programming problem, a Lagrangian dual problem can be constructed
by dropping some (complicating) constraints while introducing a weighted linear penalty term
in the objective function to penalize any violation of the constraints. For a minimization
problem, the Lagrangian dual problem provides a lower bound on the optimal value of the
primal problem (this is weak duality), and an even nicer property is that the dual is a concave
maximization problem. Thus, solving a dual problem is literally solving a convex optimization
problem. However, unlike in linear programming, strong duality cannot necessarily be
established for general nonlinear programming problems. There may exist a duality gap; that is,
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the optimal value of the primal problem is greater than that of the dual problem. Under suitable
convexity assumptions and constraint qualifications (Bazaraa et al. 2006), strong duality holds.
But this is rather restrictive in practice.
In contrast to Lagrangian relaxation, nonlinear penalty function methods add a weighted
nonlinear penalty term in the objective function to penalize violations of the constraints.
Nonlinear penalty function methods are commonly used in continuous nonlinear
programming. If for each weight, we can find a solution to the penalty problem, then the
penalty problem provides a lower bound on the optimal value of the primal (minimization)
problem. Moreover, if the set of all the solutions to the penalty problem is compact, then by
choosing the weight sufficiently large, the objective value of the penalty problem can be made
arbitrarily close to the optimal value of the primal problem (Bazaraa et al. 2006). Note that the
above results are valid for both convex and nonconvex continuous optimization problems.
Hadj-Alouane and Bean (1997) extended the results of penalty function methods for
continuous nonlinear program to multiple choice integer program, which is a linear binary
program. General linear constraints are relaxed by a nonlinear penalty function and the
corresponding dual problem has weak and strong duality. In this research, we generalize the
results in Hadj-Alouane and Bean (1997) for finite discrete optimization problems. We present
and prove some important results that validate using nonlinear penalty function methods to
solve finite discrete optimization problems.
Certain notations will be used throughout. LetN= {1,2,3, . . .} be the set of natural numbers
and R be the set of real numbers. Let R+ and R++ denote the set of nonnegative and positive
real numbers, respectively. Denote by Rn the set of n-dimensional real vectors. If u is a vector in
Rn , then u ≤ 0 and u = 0 mean that all components of u are nonpositive and zeros, respectively.
We use the symbol min to refer to either “minimize (an optimization problem)” or “minimum
(value).” Similar simplification applies to the symbol max. The exact meaning will be clear from
context. If (·) stands for an optimization problem, then v(·) is its optimal value.
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Consider the following discrete optimization problem, which we call the primal problem.
(P ) min
x
f (x)
s. t. g (x)≤ 0
h(x)= 0
x ∈X ,
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn is a vector of decision variables, with each component taking some
discrete values. Both g (x) = (g1(x), . . . , gq (x)) and h(x) = (h1(x), . . . ,hl (x)) are vector functions
with q and l components, where q, l ∈ N. Functions f , g1, . . . , gq , and h1, . . . , hl are bounded
and real-valued functions that can be arbitrary nonlinear or nonconvex. The feasible set of the
problem is denoted by S = { x ∈ Rn | g (x) ≤ 0,h(x) = 0}∩X . The set S consists of explicit
constraints g (x) ≤ 0 and h(x) = 0 and other constraints represented by set X , which is a finite
and nonempty subset of Rn . The set X might represent some simple constraints that can be
easily handled, such as lower and upper bounds on the variables. We assume that the constraints
g (x)≤ 0 and h(x)= 0 are “complicating” in terms of solving the problem, whileX is “easy.” Any
vector (point) in S is called feasible, while any point not in S is called infeasible. A point x∗ is
called optimal or a solution if it solves the problem. The corresponding number f (x∗)= v(P ) is
called the optimal value.
Penalty function methods drop the complicating constraints g (x) ≤ 0 and h(x) = 0 by
introducing to the objective function f a weighted penalty for constraint violations. In general,
for a minimization problem, a penalty function shall incur a positive penalty for infeasible
solutions and no penalty for feasible solutions (Bazaraa et al. 2006). This concept is formalized
as follows.
Definition II.1. A functionα(x) : Rn 7→R is called a penalty function for problem (P ) if it satisfies:
(i) α(x)> 0 if g (x)> 0 or h(x) 6= 0; (ii) α(x)= 0 if g (x)≤ 0 and h(x)= 0.
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Various forms of penalty functions satisfying the above definition exist. A suitable
nonlinear penalty function is defined by
α(x) :=
q∑
i=1
[
g+i (x)
]2+ l∑
i=1
[hi (x)]
2 ,
where g+i (x) :=max{0, gi (x)}.
The transformed objective function F (x,λ) : Rn ×R+ 7→R is defined by
F (x,λ) := f (x)+λα(x),
where λ≥ 0 is a scalar and is called the penalty parameter.
Rather than solve the problem (P ), we consider the following “easy” penalty problem
(PPλ) minx
F (x,λ)
s. t. x ∈X .
Hadj-Alouane and Bean (1997) considered the multiple choice integer program with linear
objective function and linear constraints. We now generalize the results in Hadj-Alouane and
Bean (1997) to finite discrete optimization with nonlinear objective function and nonlinear
constraints. This generalization is meaningful, since many practical problems, including the
batch scheduling problem at hand, can be formulated as finite discrete optimization models.
Proposition II.1 (Weak Duality). v(PPλ) ≤ v(P ) for all λ ≥ 0; that is, the optimal value of the
penalty problem provides a lower bound on the optimal value of the primal problem.
Definition II.2. Consider a general optimization problem
(GP ) min
x
f (x)
s. t. x ∈X ,
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where f is a real-valued function defined on Rn andX is a nonempty subset of Rn . For ² ∈R++,
we call x¯ an ²-optimal solution to (GP ) if x¯ ∈X and f (x¯)≤ infx∈X f (x)+².
Lemma II.1. For a given λ ≥ 0, if x¯ is ²-optimal to (PPλ), g (x¯) ≤ 0, and h(x¯) = 0, then x¯ is also
²-optimal to (P ).
Lemma II.2. For a given λ≥ 0, if x∗ is optimal to (PPλ), g (x∗)≤ 0, and h(x∗)= 0, then x∗ is also
optimal to (P ).
Proposition II.2 (Strong Duality). Let Sλ be the finite set of optimal solutions to (PPλ). If (P ) is
feasible, then there exists λ¯≥ 0, such that for all λ≥ λ¯, there exists x∗ ∈Sλ such thatα(x∗)= 0 and
x∗ is optimal to (P ).
Note that we do not assume that the optimization problems are convex in the above
results. The results are valid for both convex and nonconvex optimization problems. The only
assumptions are that the objective and constraints functions are discrete and the general setX
is finite and nonempty. The penalty problem provides bounds for the primal problem. Under
certain conditions, we can obtain the optimal value of the primal problem by solving the
corresponding penalty problem.
II.4.2. The Relaxed Problem
With the mathematical tools that we have developed in Section II.4.1, we can obtain a
relaxed problem, which is a dual problem to the original problem (OP ).
Define the space where constraints (II.3)–(II.11) live as the setX . Constraint (II.2) is relaxed
and included in the objective (II.1). The relaxed problem, denoted by (RP ), can be written as
(RP ) min
x
∑
j∈J
w j T j +λα(x) (II.13)
subject to:
x ∈X , (II.14)
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where λ> 0 is a penalty parameter or multiplier, and
α(x) := ∑
m∈M ,b∈B
[
max
(
0,
∑
j∈J
s j x j m[b]−Km
)]2
. (II.15)
We see that if x is infeasible to (OP ), which means that constraint (II.2) is violated, then
α(x) > 0. Similarly, if x is feasible to (OP ), which means that constraint (II.2) is satisfied, then
α(x)= 0. Thus, α(x) is a penalty function per Definition II.1.
We can solve the original problem (OP ) by solving the relaxed problem (RP ). This is
validated by Propositions II.3 and II.4.
Proposition II.3. For a given λ≥ 0, if x∗ is optimal to (RP ) and α(x∗)= 0, then x∗ is also optimal
to (OP ).
Proposition II.4 (Strong Duality). Let Sλ be the finite set of optimal solutions to (RP ). If (OP ) is
feasible, then there exists λ¯≥ 0, such that for all λ≥ λ¯, there exists x∗ ∈Sλ such thatα(x∗)= 0 and
x∗ is optimal to (OP ).
The relaxed problem (RP ) is “easier” than the original problem (OP ), since (RP )
eliminates the capacity constraint (II.2). In other words, the relaxed problem (RP ) does not
restrict the number of jobs that a machine can handle simultaneously. Essentially, this is the
unbounded model as described in Brucker et al. (1998). However, Brucker et al. proved that
minimizing total weighted tardiness is NP-hard even for the unbounded model. Since both the
original problem (OP ) and the relaxed problem (RP ) are NP-hard, we propose to use genetic
algorithms to heuristically solve them, and hence the underlying batch scheduling problem.
II.5. A Genetic Algorithm Approach
The history of genetic algorithms (GAs) can be traced back to the early 1950s when some
biologists used computers to simulate genetic systems (Goldberg 1989). However, the work of
John Holland in the 1970s led to GAs known to us today (Dasgupta and Michalewicz 1997). GAs
are adaptive search algorithms that mimic the process of natural evolution. A genetic algorithm
starts with a population of randomly generated chromosomes (When decoded, each
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chromosome will represent a solution to the problem at hand), and then applies genetic
operators such as selection, crossover, and mutation, to evolve the population from one
generation to the next. The algorithm stops when either a satisfactory solution has been
identified, or the maximum number of generations has been reached. See the standard text by
Goldberg (1989) for additional information about GAs.
GAs have been extensively used for optimization problems during the past three decades.
Here we briefly review some of the applications of GAs to scheduling problems in the last ten
years. Wang and Uzsoy (2002) combined dynamic programming algorithm with a genetic
algorithm to minimize maximum lateness on a batch processing machine in the presence of
dynamic job arrivals. Koh et al. (2004) studied the problems of scheduling parallel identical
batch processing machines with arbitrary job sizes and incompatible job families. They
considered three kinds of problems whose performance measures are makespan, total
completion time, and total weighted completion time, respectively. They devised a number of
heuristics and use genetic algorithms to solve the problems. Koh et al. (2005) studied the same
problems of scheduling a single batch processing machines using GAs. Damodaran et al. (2006)
proposed a GA to minimize makespan on a single batch processing machine with non-identical
job sizes. Balasubramanian et al. (2004) and Mönch et al. (2005) used GAs to minimize total
weighted tardiness on parallel identical batch processing machines. Lin et al. (2011) studied
unrelated parallel machine scheduling problems considering three performance measures:
makespan, total weighted completion time, and total weighted tardiness. They compared the
performance of a number of heuristics and a genetic algorithm, and found that the proposed
genetic algorithm outperforms other heuristics for each of the three performance measures.
To apply GA to a scheduling problem, a suitable encoding or representation for the
problem must be devised. The chromosomal encoding of the scheduling problem may take
many forms and have a direct impact on the performance of the GA. A common problem in
applying GAs is that some genetic operations may create feasibility issues, e.g., crossing over
two feasible solutions does not result in a feasible solution as an offspring. Given a scheduling
problem, often the hardest part in applying a GA is to encode the solutions as strings so that
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crossovers of feasible solutions result in feasible ones. Based on the problem structure, we
employ two genetic algorithms with different encoding schemes for the relaxed problem (RP )
and the original problem (OP ). The two genetic algorithms are Multiple Choice Genetic
Algorithm (MCGA) and Random Keys Genetic Algorithm (RKGA).
II.5.1. Multiple Choice Genetic Algorithm for the Relaxed Problem
To solve the relaxed problem (RP ), we propose to use Multiple Choice Genetic Algorithm
(MCGA). Per Proposition II.3, we can optimally solve (OP ) by optimally solving (RP ), with the
additional requirement of α(x∗) = 0. Proposition II.4 establishes the existence of λ for which
Proposition II.3 can be applied.
The MCGA adopts the genetic operators elitist reproduction, Bernoulli crossover,
immigration, and post-tournament selection, as described in Bean (1994) and Norman and
Bean (1999). Below we show how the MCGA is used to solve the relaxed problem (RP ).
Encoding:
For the relaxed problem (RP ), we apply the following encoding scheme. First, estimate the
maximum number of batches, Bˆ , that will be formed on each machine. Let
Bˆ =
⌊ ∑
j∈J s j
minm∈M Km
⌋
,
where bac denotes the largest integer not greater than a. Then, for each job j ∈ J , randomly
generate a pair (m,b) j , where m ∈ {1, . . . , M } and b ∈ {1, . . . , Bˆ}. This method ensures that job j is
assigned to exactly one batch and processed exactly on one machine. It is equivalent to choosing
exactly one variable from each partitioning set {x j m[b]}
J
j=1 to be one and all other variables to
be zero. This is why the proposed GA is called Multiple Choice GA. The chromosome is the
concatenation of the pairs for all the jobs in the order of j1, . . . , j J .
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Example II.1. For a scheduling problem with 10 jobs and 2 parallel machines, a chromosome,
C , is given by
C = {(2,1)1, (1,1)2, (1,2)3, (1,1)4, (2,2)5, (1,2)6, (2,1)7, (2,1)8, (2,2)9, (1,2)10},
which is then translated to the schedule as shown in Figure II.1.
j2, j4
j1, j7, j8 j5, j9
j3, j6, j10
b1,1 b1,2
b2,1 b2,2
m1
m2
Figure II.1. A Schedule Represented by Chromosome C
The schedule in Figure II.1 is thus: jobs 2 and 4 in the first batch on machine 1 (denoted
by b1,1); jobs 3, 6, and 10 in the second batch on machine 1 (denoted by b1,2); jobs 1, 7, and 8 in
the first batch on machine 2 (denoted by b2,1); jobs 5 and 9 in the second batch on machine 2
(denoted by b2,2). ♦
Initialization:
Randomly generate a population of chromosomes (solutions) to make up the initial
generation (called generation 0). Set λ = 0. Evaluate the objective value for each solution per
Procedure Eval-RP as shown in Figure II.3.
Estimation of λ:
The value of the penalty weight, λ, is important for MCGA. If λ is too small, many infeasible
solutions are allowed to breed; if it is too large, the search is limited only to feasible solutions,
i.e., the interior of the search space. However, it is not uncommon to find the global optimum on
or near the boundary of a feasible region, so the slightly infeasible solutions may be close to the
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optimum (Reeves 1997) and have good genetic materials to breed better solutions. In view of this
fact, we use dynamic or adaptive penalty weight, which adjusts itself as the population evolves.
The use of adaptive weights can be found in the literature, see, e.g., Fairley (1991), Smith and
Tate (1993), and Hadj-Alouane and Bean (1997). In this research, we adopt the adaptive penalty
weight approach by Hadj-Alouane and Bean, who used a simple heuristic to dynamically adjust
the value of the penalty weight. This approach is described as follows. Start with a fixed λ, and
run the MCGA for a certain number of generations, Nλ. Then check whether the best solution
has been infeasible (with positive penalty) or feasible (with zero penalty) for each of these Nλ
generations. Increase λ by the factor β1 if the best solution has been infeasible for each of these
Nλ generations, and decrease λ by the factor β2 if the best solution has been feasible for each of
these Nλ generations. If the best solution mixes with feasible and infeasible ones, continue to
use the current λ. The effect of this adaptive approach is that the solution is oscillating around
the boundary of the feasible region. This effect is referred to as strategic oscillation in tabu search
(Glover et al. 1995).
Let λk be the penalty weight used to evaluate objective values for the population of
chromosomes (solutions) in generation k ≥ 1. The value of λk is adjusted per the procedure
outlined in the above paragraph, which is formally named Procedure Adj-λ as shown in
Figure II.2.
To get the procedure running, we need to provide λ1. From the proof of Proposition II.2, we
know that λ¯=max{λ0,0}, where
λ0 = max
x∈X ,α(x)>0
f (x∗)− f (x)
α(x)
= max
x∈X ,α(x)>0
TWT∗−TWT
α(x)
, (II.16)
where TWT∗ is the optimal TWT for the original problem (OP ).5 But the problem is that TWT∗ is
what we are seeking after, and we don’t know the value yet. We use the following method, similar
5In (II.16), α(x)> 0, hence x is infeasible to (OP ). So the TWT appeared in (II.16) could be smaller than TWT∗.
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(1) Choose β1 >β2 > 1 and Nλ.
(2) k ← 1.
(3) Set λ1 (How to set λ1 will be discussed in this section shortly).
(4) Run the MCGA for Nλ generations, and then check the feasibility of
the best solution for each of the Nλ generations.
(5) λk+1 = β1λk , if the best solution has positive penalty for each of the
Nλ generations.
(6) λk+1 =λk /β2, if the best solution has zero penalty for each of the Nλ
generations.
(7) λk+1 =λk , otherwise.
(8) k ← k+1.
(9) Stop iterating λk when MCGA stops.
Figure II.2. Procedure: Adj-λ
to that used in Hadj-Alouane and Bean (1997), to approximate λ0:
λ0 ≈ λˆ0 = 1
N0
∑
α(xi )>0
i∈G0, xi∈X
TWTL −TWTi
α(xi )
,
where G0 is the set of solutions in generation 0, N0 is the number of solutions, in G0, with positive
penalty, and TWTL is the lower bound of the TWT for the original problem (OP ). If TWTL is not
available, simply use 0. Set λ1 = λ¯≈max{λˆ0,²}, where ² is a positive and small scalar.
Evaluation:
The procedure for evaluating the objective value TWT+λα(x) is given in Figure II.3. Note
that the schedule constructed above may violate the capacity constraint (II.2), i.e., the total sizes
of all the jobs in a batch may exceed the capacity of the machine. We call the schedule that
violates the capacity constraint infeasible, and the schedule that satisfies the capacity constraint
feasible. The infeasible schedule incurs a positive penalty α(x), as defined by (II.15). And a
weighted positive penalty, λα(x), is added to the TWT. Through the dynamics of the genetic
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algorithm, feasible schedule will evolve a smaller TWT, which is good, since our objective is to
minimize TWT.
(1) For the first batch on each machine, the batch can start only after all
jobs in the batch are ready.
(2) For all subsequent batches, a batch can start only after all jobs in the
batch are ready and the processing of the immediate previous batch
on the same machine is completed.
(3) The processing time of a batch is equal to the longest processing
time of any job assigned to the batch.
(4) The completion time of a batch is equal to the start time of the batch
plus the processing time of the batch.
(5) The completion time of each job, c j , is equal to the completion time
of the batch that contains the job.
(6) Calculate the tardiness of each job, T j =max{c j −d j ,0}.
(7) Calculate the total weighted tardiness, TWT=∑ j∈J w j T j .
(8) Calculate the penalty α(x).
(9) Calculate the objective value TWT+λα(x).
Figure II.3. Procedure: Eval-RP
Elitist Reproduction:
This is called elitist strategy in Goldberg (1989). We copy the best chromosomes, say 20% of
the chromosomes in the population, from one generation to the next, so that the best solution is
monotonically improving. We call the chromosomes copied to the next generation clones.
Bernoulli Crossover:
Bernoulli crossover (called parameterized uniform crossover in Spears and De Jong 1991) is
used in place of the traditional one- or two-point crossover. Two chromosomes, say,P1 andP2,
are randomly selected as parents from the current population. At each gene, toss a biased coin
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to determine which parent will contribute its allele to the two offspring O1 and O2. Specifically,
we assume that:
(1) A head (H) selects the allele from parent P1 for offspring O1, and the allele from parent P2
for offspring O2;
(2) A tail (T) selects the allele from parentP2 for offspring O1, and the allele from parentP1 for
offspring O2.
Example II.2. Returning to the ten-job, two-machine problem as described in Example II.1,
assume that the two parent chromosomes are
P1 =
{
(2,1)1, (1,1)2, (1,2)3, (1,1)4, (2,2)5, (1,2)6, (2,1)7, (2,1)8, (2,2)9, (1,2)10
}
,
P2 =
{
(1,1)1, (1,2)2, (1,1)3, (2,1)4, (1,2)5, (2,2)6, (1,1)7, (2,2)8, (2,1)9, (2,2)10
}
,
and that the outcome of the ten tosses is (H, T, H, H, T, H, T, H, H, H). The two offspring O1 and
O2, generated by the Bernoulli crossover, are given in Table II.1. We can then translate the two
offspring O1 and O2 to schedules and evaluate the objective values per Procedure Eval-RP. ♦
Table II.1. An Example of Bernoulli Crossover
Toss H T H H T H T H H H
P1 (2,1)1 (1,1)2 (1,2)3 (1,1)4 (2,2)5 (1,2)6 (2,1)7 (2,1)8 (2,2)9 (1,2)10
P2 (1,1)1 (1,2)2 (1,1)3 (2,1)4 (1,2)5 (2,2)6 (1,1)7 (2,2)8 (2,1)9 (2,2)10
O1 (2,1)1 (1,2)2 (1,2)3 (1,1)4 (1,2)5 (1,2)6 (1,1)7 (2,1)8 (2,2)9 (1,2)10
O2 (1,1)1 (1,1)2 (1,1)3 (2,1)4 (2,2)5 (2,2)6 (2,1)7 (2,2)8 (2,1)9 (2,2)10
Immigration:
Rather than use the traditional gene-by-gene mutation, we use immigration as described
in Bean (1994). At each new generation, a small number of new chromosomes are randomly
generated as immigrants. Immigration diversifies the search space and protects from loss of
genetic materials possibly due to reproduction and crossover. Immigration plays the same role
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as mutation; it prevents premature convergence of the population. Since an optimal solution can
be selected with a finitely positive probability by the immigration operator, we conclude that, if
the genetic algorithm is run long enough, it will find the optimal solution with probability one .
Post-tournament Selection:
Post-tournament selection (Norman and Bean 1999) is used in conjunction with Bernoulli
crossover to fill the next generation. The two offspring O1 and O2 are evaluated, and only the one
with better objective value is allowed to enter the new generation.
Pseudo-code for the MCGA:
The MCGA described above is summarized in the pseudo-code listed in Figure II.4.
Computational results are reported in Section II.6.
II.5.2. Random Keys Genetic Algorithm for the Original Problem
We use Random Keys Genetic Algorithm (RKGA) as the solution method for the original
problem (OP ). RKGA, introduced by Bean (1994), differs from traditional GAs most notably in
the representation of the solution. RKGA encodes a solution with random numbers, which in
turn serve as sort keys to decode the solution. RKGA has been successfully applied to various
scheduling problems, resource allocation problems, and other optimization problems, see, e.g.,
Bean (1994), Norman and Bean (1999, 2000), Wang and Uzsoy (2002), Kurz and Askin (2004),
Gonçalves et al. (2005), Snyder and Daskin (2006), Samanlioglu et al. (2007), Mendes et al. (2009),
and Gonçalves et al. (2011).
The RKGA operates in two spaces, the chromosome space and the schedule building
space. Random numbers are typically sampled from [0,1]n . These random numbers in the
chromosome space are used as tags to represent solutions. The RKGA searches the
chromosome space as a surrogate for the schedule building space. Points in the chromosome
space are mapped to the schedule building space based on the sorted random key values.
Example II.3. Consider a ten-job, single-machine scheduling problem. For each job, we
generate a uniform random number between 0 and 1. This would result in a chromosome with
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Choose parameters:
maximum number of generations: Nmax
population size: Npop
number of clones: Nc
number of immigrants: Nm
frequency to adjust λ: Nλ
Determine a stopping criterion for the program:
Nmax or an objective value bound
for each chromosome of the population do
randomly generate solution
evaluate objective value per Procedure Eval-RP
end for
estimate the initial value of λ
stop← 0
count← 0
while stop= 0 do
count← count+1
sort old population by objective value
copy Nc best solutions to the next generation
adjust the value of λ per Procedure Adj-λ
for remainder of the population do
randomly choose two parents from old population
perform Bernoulli crossover
evaluate objective values for the two offspring
keep the better offspring in the new generation
discard the other offspring
end for
replace Nm worst chromosomes with immigrants
evaluate objective values for the immigrants
update the best solution found so far
if the stopping criterion is met then
stop← 1
end if
end while
Figure II.4. Pseudo-code for the MCGA
10 genes:
(0.94,0.87,0.56,0.53,0.77,0.36,0.30,0.79,0.48,0.71).
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Sorting the random keys in increasing order would result in the job sequence:
j7 → j6 → j9 → j4 → j3 → j10 → j5 → j8 → j2 → j1.
If our objective is to minimize TWT, this sequence can be evaluated to calculate TWT. During the
running of the RKGA program, jobs that should be early in the sequence evolve small keys and
jobs that should be later evolve large keys. ♦
The random keys encoding has the advantage over a literal encoding. In RKGA, crossovers
are executed on the chromosomes, the random keys, not on the job sequences. Therefore the
offspring always contain random keys that can be sorted into an ordered set. Since any ordered
set of random keys can be interpreted as a job sequence, all offspring are feasible solutions.
Both the RKGA and the MCGA employ the same genetic operators elitist reproduction,
Bernoulli crossover, immigration, and post-tournament selection, as discussed in Bean (1994),
Norman and Bean (1999), and also in Section II.5.1. However, RKGA differs from MCGA in the
encoding. Below we describe the encoding used for RKGA, which is suitable for the original
problem (OP ).
Encoding:
In order to apply RKGA to the batch scheduling problem, we now extend the RKGA
encoding technique to the multiple machines setting, using the method described in Bean
(1994). Consider the n-job, m-machine scheduling problem to minimize TWT. Each job is
encoded as a gene. Thus a chromosome for the n jobs has n genes. To obtain the gene for each
job, generate an integer randomly sampled from {1, . . . , M } and add a uniform random number
between 0 and 1. This real number serves as the random key. In the mapping, the integer part of
a random key is interpreted as the machine assignment for that job and the fractional parts of
all the random keys are sorted to provide the job sequence on each machine. For each machine,
form batches from the job sequence on that machine such that the total size of all the jobs in
the batch is less than or equal to the capacity of the machine. The processing time of a batch is
determined by the longest processing time of all the jobs contained in the batch, as described in
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Section II.3. Assuming that batches are processed at their earliest possible time, a schedule can
then be constructed and evaluated for TWT. The calculation of TWT is formalized in Procedure
Eval-OP, as given in Figure II.5.
(1) Sort the n genes (random keys) that correspond to the n jobs in
increasing order.
(2) Determine the machine assignment for each job and the job
sequence on each machine.
(3) For each machine, form batches from the job sequence on the
machine such that the capacity of the machine is not exceeded.
(4) Determine the processing time for each batch.
(5) Determine the start and completion times for each batch.
(6) Determine the completion time for each job, which is equal to the
completion time of the batch that contains the job.
(7) Calculate the tardiness for each job.
(8) Calculate TWT.
Figure II.5. Procedure: Eval-OP
Pseudo-code for the RKGA:
The pseudo-code for the RKGA is listed in Figure II.6. Computational results are reported
in the next section.
II.6. Computational Experiments
This section presents a number of computational experiments on the performance of the
proposed genetic algorithms MCGA and RKGA. The GAs were coded in C++ and run on a
desktop computer with a 2.13 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU, 2 GB RAM, and the Windows XP
operating system. The mathematical programming model for the original problem (OP ) was
coded in AMPL and implemented in CPLEX 10.1 on the same computer. The AMPL/CPLEX
implementation serves as our baseline approach.
30
Choose parameters:
maximum number of generations: Nmax
population size: Npop
number of clones: Nc
number of immigrants: Nm
Determine a stopping criterion for the program:
Nmax or an objective value bound
for each chromosome of the population do
generate random keys
evaluate the objective value (TWT) per Procedure Eval-OP
end for
stop← 0
count← 0
while stop= 0 do
count← count+1
sort old population by objective value
copy Nc best chromosomes to the new generation
for remainder of the population do
randomly choose two parents from old population
perform Bernoulli crossover
evaluate objective values for the two offspring
keep the better offspring in the new generation
discard the other offspring
end for
replace Nm worst chromosomes with immigrants
evaluate objective values for the immigrants
update the best solution found so far
if the stopping criterion is met then
stop← 1
end if
end while
Figure II.6. Pseudo-code for the RKGA
II.6.1. Data Generation
Problem instances were randomly generated in a manner similar to Akturk and Ozdemir
(2001). The following data were generated for the experiments: the number of machines,
machine capacities, the number of jobs, job sizes, weights, job processing times, ready times,
and due times.
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We consider the case of two parallel batch processing machines (Our approach also applies
to other cases with more than two parallel batch processing machines). The machine capacity
was randomly generated from U [8,12], where U [a,b] denotes a discrete uniform distribution
within the interval [a,b]. Three levels of the number of jobs were selected to represent the sizes
of the problem instances: small (20 jobs), medium (40 jobs), and large (80 jobs). Two levels of
job sizes were selected to test the effect of small job sizes (U [1,4]), and small to large job sizes
(U [2,8]). The job priority (weight) was randomly generated from U [1,5], with 5 being of the
highest priority and 1 being of the lowest. The job processing time, p j , was randomly generated
from U [1,10]. The job ready time, r j , was randomly generated from U
[
0,
⌊
γCˆmax
⌋]
, and the job
due time, d j , was randomly generated from r j +U
[
0,
⌊
δCˆmax
⌋]
, where Cˆmax is an estimate of the
makespan. We simply let
Cˆmax =
s¯
∑
j p j∑
m Km
,
where s¯ =∑ j s j /J is the average job size. Parameters γ and δ control the spread of ready times
and due times. Larger values of γ and δ indicate wider range of release times and due times. If δ
is small, we have tight due times. If δ is large, we have loose due times. In our experiments, we
set γ= 0.5, and δ= 0.5 or 1.0. Totally, there are 12 unique parameter combinations.
Table II.2 summarizes these parameters and their values used in the experiments. Five
replications were made for each unique parameter combination, giving 60 randomly generated
problem instances in total.
Table II.2. Parameters and Values Used in the Experiments
Parameter Level Value
Number of machines, M 1 2
Machine capacity, Km 1 U [8,12]
Number of jobs, J 3 20, 40, 80
Size, s j 2 U [1,4],U [2,8]
Weight, w j 1 U [1,5]
Processing time, p j 1 U [1,10]
Ready time, r j 1 U
[
0,
⌊
γCˆmax
⌋]
,γ= 0.5
Due time, d j 2 r j +U
[
0,
⌊
δCˆmax
⌋]
,δ= 0.5,1.0
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II.6.2. Parameter Settings for the GAs
We chose the parameter settings for the GAs by trial and error. Extensive preliminary
experiments showed that the maximum number of generations and the population size have
the largest impact on the performance of the GAs. Specifically, we found that, for MCGA, larger
population size reduces the speed of the algorithm significantly but does not improve the
solution quality in a meaningful way. We also found that MCGA converges slowly, so a larger
number of generations are necessary. For RKGA, the story is different. We found that, for RKGA,
larger population size help improve the solution quality without increasing the computational
overhead dramatically. And in general, RKGA converges pretty fast, so a moderate number of
generations suffice. Based on these observations, we chose for the MCGA the population size
100 and the maximum number of generations 10,000, while for RKGA the population size 1,000
and the maximum number of generations 500. The number of clones also has a great impact on
the performance of the GAs. For MCGA, we found that a larger number of clones (e.g., 20% of
the population size) tend to deteriorate the convergence speed. For RKGA, a larger number of
clones (20% of the population size) do help improve the solution quality. Therefore, we chose
for MCGA the number of clones to be 2% of the population size, while for RKGA the number of
clones to be 20% of the population size. The immigration operator diversifies the search space
and protects from loss of genetic materials that can be caused by reproduction and crossover. It
is usually set equal to a small percentage (on the order of 1/100) of the population size. In our
experiments, the number of immigrants was set at 1% of the population size for both the GAs.
For MCGA, additional parameters need to be determined. We chose the number of
generations to adjust the penalty parameter, i.e., the value of Nλ, to be 10. Parameters β1 and β2
are required if such adjustment efforts are deemed necessary. To prevent cycling and also
achieve fast improvement at the earlier stages of the algorithm (Hadj-Alouane and Bean 1997),
we set β1 = 8, and β2 = 0.7β1 = 5.6.
The parameter settings for the GAs are summarized in Table II.3.
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Table II.3. Parameter Settings for the GAs
Parameter MCGA RKGA
Maximum number of generations, Nmax 10,000 500
Population size, Npop 100 1,000
Number of clones, Nc 2 200
Number of immigrants, Nm 1 10
Frequency to adjust λ, Nλ 10 –
Increasing factor, β1 8 –
Decreasing factor, β2 5.6 –
II.6.3. Computational Results
For each of the 60 randomly generated problem instances, 10 replications of both the
MCGA and the RKGA were executed, each with a different random seed. So there are 1,200 runs
of the genetic algorithms. All the 60 problem instances were also solved with AMPL/CPLEX on
the same computer. Since CPLEX is an optimal algorithm, it can find optimal solutions in
theory if it is run long enough. However, for our problems, oftentimes CPLEX shut off before it
could find optimal solutions, simply due to the limit of the hardware, e.g., running out of
memory. Preliminary experiments indicated that, even for the 20-job 2-machine problem
instances, CPLEX failed to report optimal solutions after three hours of run, and that the
solutions showed little or no improvements over those from the one hour of run. Therefore, it
was decided to run CPLEX up to one hour for all the 60 problem instances. In this case, we call
the CPLEX approach (with one hour run time limit) CPLEX-Heuristic, or simply CPLEX-H.
Tables II.4 and II.5 present the computational results from MCGA, RKGA, and CPLEX-H.
The 60 problem instances were grouped according to the factor levels. Table II.4 presents the
computational results for “tight” due time cases (δ = 0.5), while Table II.5 for “loose” due time
cases (δ= 1.0). In the tables, column (1) is the unique ID of the problem instance. Column (2) is
the factor combination of the problem instance. A triplet (Jρ , sµ,dν), where ρ ∈ {1,2,3}, µ ∈ {1,2},
and ν ∈ {1,2}, is used to denote the factor combination of the problem instance. For example,
(J3, s1,d2) indicates that the number of jobs is at level 3 (80 jobs), the job size at level 1 (U [1,4]),
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and the due time at level 2 (δ= 1.0). Columns (3)–(6) report the TWT and run time (in seconds)
from MCGA and RKGA. For each problem instance, MCGA and RKGA were run 10 independent
replications, each with a different random seed. The minimum TWT over the 10 runs was
recorded. The time (in seconds) is the average computation time of the 10 runs. Columns
(7)–(8) report the TWT and run time (one hour here) from CPLEX-H. Columns (9)–(11) compare
the three approaches in terms of TWT, where M/C stands for MCGA vs. CPLEX-H, R/C stands
for RKGA vs. CPLEX-H, and M/R stands for MCGA vs. RKGA. For example, for M/C in column
(9), the percentage improvement in TWT is calculated by (TWTC−TWTM)/TWTC, where C and
M denote CPLEX-H and MCGA, respectively.
As can be seen from Tables II.4 and II.5, for all the 60 problem instances, MCGA
outperforms CPLEX-H in terms of TWT. Specifically, for the small problem instances (i.e., the
20-job problem instances 1–10 and 31–40), MCGA leads to an average improvement of about
5.85%. For the medium problem instances (i.e., the 40-job problem instances 11–20 and 41–50),
the average improvement of MCGA over CPLEX-H is about 28.08%, while for the large problem
instances (i.e., the 80-job problem instances 21–30 and 51–60), the average improvement is
about 70.43%. We see that the improvement is much bigger for medium and large problem
instances.
For all the 60 problem instances, RKGA outperforms CPLEX-H in terms of TWT, except for
5 of the 20 small problem instances, i.e., problem instances 1, 5, 33, 34, and 37. For the other 15
small problem instances, RKGA outperforms CPLEX-H, and the average improvement is about
6.12%. For the medium problem instances, the average improvement of RKGA over CPLEX-H is
about 30.82%, while for the large problem instances, the average improvement is about 78.26%.
We now compare MCGA with RKGA. We observe that, for the 20 small problem instances,
MCGA achieves better TWT than RKGA, except for problem instances 2, 9, 38, and 39. And the
average improvement of MCGA over RKGA is about 2.88%. For the medium and large problem
instances, RKGA outperforms MCGA. The average improvement is 4.02% for medium problem
instances, and 33.78% for large problem instances.
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We observe that, for all the problem instances, MCGA and RKGA require much less
computation times compared with CPLEX-H (which is fixed at one hour). For example, the
average computation time for RKGA is 3.17 seconds for small problem instances, 6.92 seconds
for medium problem instances, and 15.60 seconds for large problem instances. And for the
same scale of the problem instances, RKGA is faster than MCGA. For example, RKGA is 6 times
faster than MCGA for small problem instances, 9 times faster for medium problem instances,
and 14 times faster for large problem instances. The differences in computation times stem
from the ways how the two approaches construct schedules. In the MCGA approach, the MCGA
first assigns batches to machines, and then assigns jobs to batches. The number of batches on
each machine is pre-determined. This method results in inefficiency, since we may end up with
empty batches. MCGA also involves more computations, since it requires much more
generations due to its relatively slow convergence speed. By contrast, in the RKGA approach,
the way of forming batches is parsimonious. The RKGA first assigns jobs to machines, and then
forms batches on machines such that the machine capacity is not exceeded. There are no waste
empty batches in the RKGA.
We also observe that, within the same set of problem instances (i.e., small, medium, or
large), computation times for both the MCGA and the RKGA are pretty consistent. For example,
for the small problem instances, computation times in MCGA are around 20 seconds across
different problem instances and different random seeds.6 Moreover, the computation times are
consistent no matter whether the due times are tight (δ= 0.5) or loose (δ= 1.0). However, this is
not the case with CPLEX-H. In general, a problem instance with loose due time is easier than
that with tight due time. In the preliminary experiments, we made up two test instances for the
20-job 2-machine problem, one with tight due time, the other with loose due time. For the test
instance with loose due time, CPLEX-H reported that it had found the optimal solution7 after 64
seconds, while for the test instance with tight due time, CPLEX-H failed to report that it had
6The computation times (and the values of TWT) for different random seeds are not reported here.
7We knew for sure that CPLEX-H had found the optimal solution since the value of TWT was reported as 0, the
lowest TWT we can get.
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found the optimal solution after 3600 seconds (1 hour). For both of the test instances, the
computation times in MCGA and RKGA were consistent (around 20 seconds in MCGA and 3
seconds in RKGA).
The computational results also show one important merit of both MCGA and RKGA. That is,
the computation times increase in a reasonable manner as problem size increases. For CPLEX-H,
the computation times are unpredictable as problem size increases.8
II.7. Conclusions
In this research, we study the scheduling problem of minimizing total weighted tardiness
on parallel non-identical batch processing machines. We first formulated the (primal) problem
as a nonlinear integer programming model. Moreover, we proved that the primal problem can
be solved exactly by solving a corresponding dual problem using the (nonlinear) penalty
function method. Since both the primal and the dual problems are NP-hard, two genetic
algorithms, multiple choice genetic algorithm (MCGA) and random keys genetic algorithm
(RKGA) were proposed to heuristically solve them. We found that both GAs consistently
outperformed a standard mathematical programming package in terms of solutions and
computation times. We also found that for small scale problem instances, MCGA outperformed
RKGA, while for large scale problem instances, RKGA outperformed MCGA.
These observations suggest that, for small scale problem instances, a better choice is to use
MCGA, while for medium and large scale problem instances, a better choice is to use RKGA. We
also mentioned that the inefficiency of MCGA is caused by the empty batches. As a fix, we may
run RKGA first and obtain the number of batches formed on each machine. Then we use those
numbers as inputs to MCGA.9 Preliminary experiments showed that this method did improve
the solution quality of MCGA and speed up the algorithm.
8This observation comes from the preliminary experiments.
9Some adjustments may be necessary. Nonetheless, these numbers provide initial estimates on the number of
batches formed on each machine.
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Table II.4. Computational Results for Randomly Generated Problem Instances (δ= 0.5)
Prob. Factor MCGA† RKGA† CPLEX-H ‡ Improvement (%)\
TWT Sec. TWT Sec. TWT Sec. M/C R/C M/R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1 (J1, s1,d1) 339 19.49 379 3.01 347 3600 2.31 -9.22 10.55
2 (J1, s1,d1) 381 20.01 375 4.39 383 3600 0.52 2.09 -1.60
3 (J1, s1,d1) 360 19.76 374 3.00 375 3600 4.00 0.27 3.74
4 (J1, s1,d1) 327 18.61 335 2.95 346 3600 5.49 3.18 2.39
5 (J1, s1,d1) 226 19.61 249 3.02 229 3600 1.31 -8.73 9.24
6 (J1, s2,d1) 192 21.50 194 3.23 217 3600 11.52 10.60 1.03
7 (J1, s2,d1) 331 20.83 337 3.15 360 3600 8.06 6.39 1.78
8 (J1, s2,d1) 196 21.24 196 3.14 249 3600 21.29 21.29 0.00
9 (J1, s2,d1) 443 22.39 440 3.20 492 3600 9.96 10.57 -0.68
10 (J1, s2,d1) 378 21.10 378 3.16 398 3600 5.03 5.03 0.00
11 (J2, s1,d1) 759 57.13 859 6.75 1090 3600 30.37 21.19 11.64
12 (J2, s1,d1) 678 61.12 739 6.73 812 3600 16.50 8.99 8.25
13 (J2, s1,d1) 761 62.23 725 6.69 946 3600 19.56 23.36 -4.97
14 (J2, s1,d1) 726 59.17 720 6.59 836 3600 13.16 13.88 -0.83
15 (J2, s1,d1) 691 62.28 672 6.72 787 3600 12.20 14.61 -2.83
16 (J2, s2,d1) 408 62.18 397 7.39 759 3600 46.25 47.69 -2.77
17 (J2, s2,d1) 891 62.18 847 7.18 1436 3600 37.95 41.02 -5.19
18 (J2, s2,d1) 769 60.59 717 7.09 1002 3600 23.25 28.44 -7.25
19 (J2, s2,d1) 936 60.75 827 7.18 1472 3600 36.41 43.82 -13.18
20 (J2, s2,d1) 690 64.50 645 7.17 1096 3600 37.04 41.15 -6.98
21 (J3, s1,d1) 1900 219.46 1541 15.09 4691 3600 59.50 67.15 -23.30
22 (J3, s1,d1) 2413 211.28 2032 15.04 5215 3600 53.73 61.04 -18.75
23 (J3, s1,d1) 1979 208.90 1665 15.06 4731 3600 58.17 64.81 -18.86
24 (J3, s1,d1) 2468 217.42 1993 15.12 6486 3600 61.95 69.27 -23.83
25 (J3, s1,d1) 2320 213.44 1900 14.93 5548 3600 58.18 65.75 -22.11
26 (J3, s2,d1) 3736 212.07 2582 16.09 14680 3600 74.55 82.41 -44.69
27 (J3, s2,d1) 2303 218.12 1397 16.39 15609 3600 85.25 91.05 -64.85
28 (J3, s2,d1) 2881 218.58 1904 16.06 13560 3600 78.75 85.96 -51.31
29 (J3, s2,d1) 2279 217.49 1576 16.06 10590 3600 78.48 85.12 -44.61
30 (J3, s2,d1) 3482 220.67 2582 16.09 11420 3600 69.51 77.39 -34.86
† For each problem instance, MCGA and RKGA were run 10 replications, each with a different random seed.
The minimum TWT over the 10 runs was recorded. The time (in seconds) is the average computation time
of the 10 runs.
‡ We shut off CPLEX after it had run for one hour. The best TWT found so far was recorded.
\ M/C stands for MCGA vs. CPLEX-H; R/C stands for RKGA vs. CPLEX-H; M/R stands for MCGA vs. RKGA.
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Table II.5. Computational Results for Randomly Generated Problem Instances (δ= 1.0)
Prob. Factor MCGA† RKGA† CPLEX-H ‡ Improvement (%)\
TWT Sec. TWT Sec. TWT Sec. M/C R/C M/R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
31 (J1, s1,d2) 252 20.65 256 3.06 258 3600 2.33 0.78 1.56
32 (J1, s1,d2) 233 19.66 241 2.98 246 3600 5.28 2.03 3.32
33 (J1, s1,d2) 224 19.22 249 3.12 227 3600 1.32 -9.69 10.04
34 (J1, s1,d2) 192 19.77 204 2.96 198 3600 3.03 -3.03 5.88
35 (J1, s1,d2) 281 19.45 281 2.99 298 3600 5.70 5.70 0.00
36 (J1, s2,d2) 121 21.07 121 3.22 131 3600 7.63 7.63 0.00
37 (J1, s2,d2) 287 22.03 305 3.21 292 3600 1.71 -4.45 5.90
38 (J1, s2,d2) 357 22.20 354 3.37 401 3600 10.97 11.72 -0.85
39 (J1, s2,d2) 295 21.68 294 3.24 303 3600 2.64 2.97 -0.34
40 (J1, s2,d2) 187 21.16 198 3.10 201 3600 6.97 1.49 5.56
41 (J2, s1,d2) 526 60.65 524 6.67 603 3600 12.77 13.10 -0.38
42 (J2, s1,d2) 482 63.84 458 6.69 603 3600 20.07 24.05 -5.24
43 (J2, s1,d2) 582 60.73 565 6.74 781 3600 25.48 27.66 -3.01
44 (J2, s1,d2) 407 59.40 387 6.69 556 3600 26.80 30.40 -5.17
45 (J2, s1,d2) 483 58.19 490 6.75 590 3600 18.14 16.95 1.43
46 (J2, s2,d2) 455 66.58 443 7.02 691 3600 34.15 35.89 -2.71
47 (J2, s2,d2) 252 60.39 217 6.87 344 3600 26.74 36.92 -16.13
48 (J2, s2,d2) 294 63.87 269 7.07 432 3600 31.94 37.73 -9.29
49 (J2, s2,d2) 491 59.61 405 7.02 563 3600 12.79 28.06 -21.23
50 (J2, s2,d2) 136 61.39 126 7.29 680 3600 80.00 81.47 -7.94
51 (J3, s1,d2) 958 217.45 854 15.10 1884 3600 49.15 54.67 -12.18
52 (J3, s1,d2) 1140 212.24 836 15.06 3034 3600 62.43 72.45 -36.36
53 (J3, s1,d2) 776 207.01 491 15.19 2850 3600 72.77 82.77 -58.04
54 (J3, s1,d2) 1267 218.49 996 15.05 2403 3600 47.27 58.55 -27.21
55 (J3, s1,d2) 1294 221.83 783 15.25 2927 3600 55.79 73.25 -65.26
56 (J3, s2,d2) 1032 220.02 216 15.99 7432 3600 86.11 97.09 -377.78
57 (J3, s2,d2) 1195 219.21 664 16.50 7496 3600 84.06 91.14 -79.97
58 (J3, s2,d2) 296 217.34 49 15.95 6229 3600 95.25 99.21 -504.08
59 (J3, s2,d2) 1588 222.73 1024 15.81 8906 3600 82.17 88.50 -55.08
60 (J3, s2,d2) 523 225.47 265 16.18 11573 3600 95.48 97.71 -97.36
† For each problem instance, MCGA and RKGA were run 10 replications, each with a different random seed.
The minimum TWT over the 10 runs was recorded. The time (in seconds) is the average computation time
of the 10 runs.
‡ We shut off CPLEX after it had run for one hour. The best TWT found so far was recorded.
\ M/C stands for MCGA vs. CPLEX-H; R/C stands for RKGA vs. CPLEX-H; M/R stands for MCGA vs. RKGA.
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CHAPTER III
PRICING AND TIMING SUCCESSIVE PRODUCT RELEASES
III.1. Introduction
Some products are consumed quickly whereas other goods are “durable,” providing a
stream of services over an extended period of time. From the perspective of a seller, a significant
difference between selling consumable versus durable goods relates to customers’ subsequent
purchases. In the case of a consumable good, past purchases wear out or are fully consumed,
and thus a customer loses the option of continuing to use the past product. With a durable
good, consumers can continue to use their past purchases, and thus customers’ incentive to
make a subsequent purchases stem from the desire to upgrade. Therefore, a durable-good seller
must offer performance increments over time in order to induce repeat sales.
Providing past customers with an incentive to make repeat purchases is not the only
reason that durable-goods producers strive to offer improved products over time; competition,
or the threat thereof, is also a key factor. Naturally, to attract both old and new customers, when
faced with significant competition, a firm may need to update its product simply to keep pace
with an aggressive competitor. While it is well understood that competition can force a firm to
update its product (line) rapidly over time, it is less well understood how frequently a firm
would ideally wish to update its product, if unshackled by the burden of competition. In this
chapter, we consider a monopolist producer of a durable good that is based on an evolving
technology. We seek to understand what drives the monopolist’s product update frequency that
will extract maximum sales (revenues) from its upgrading customers over time.
The assumption of monopoly is strict, yet it enables us to consider precisely what product
update frequency a firm would wish to employ, if not constrained by competitive factors to do
otherwise. For the same reason, we will not impose constraints on the product update
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frequency that could stem from redesign time limitations. Essentially, we desire to understand
how the monopolist producer can time (and price) its new product versions to best extract
revenues from the upgrading set of customers over time. Very simply, competitive factors imply
an upper bound on the firm’s product refresh interval, whereas design resources and related
fixed costs imply a lower bound on the product refresh interval. When not constrained by those
limiting bounds, what policy maximizes the seller’s profit? Moreover, is the resulting
unconstrained interval so short that it would violate the implied design constraint (i.e., be
infeasible from a design or manufacturing perspective), or violate an implied competitive
constraint?
Two firms that have had significant market power over an extended period of time are Intel
and Microsoft. Intel’s CPUs and Microsoft’s Office productivity suite are examples of evolving
durable goods. While these two firms face distinct technology and manufacturing-cost
challenges, as well as competitive threats, the products have similar update intervals. In the
case of Intel, as highlighted by Druehl et al. (2009), “. . . since the introduction of the early 4004
microprocessor, Intel has typically introduced a new generation every three to four years . . . .”
The same is largely true of Microsoft Office; consider that the latest Windows version of the
Office suite was launched two years ago in 2010, the prior version was Office 2007, and the
version before that was Office 2003. Minor updates were introduced at no cost within the
interim periods. Automakers, while facing arguably stiffer competition, significantly redesign
their car models approximately once every four or five years.1 As noted above, one could argue
that these intervals are limited by design time constraints, or driven by competition. For
example, perhaps an unconstrained monopolist would wish to offer a new model only once
every ten years, but competition in these markets is driving shorter intervals of around four
years. And, perhaps even shorter intervals are desired, but these firms are unable to achieve
them, because of the time to realize new designs and manufacturing processes. By employing a
simple model of a monopolist selling successive generations of an evolving durable good to a
1Industry and Trade Summary: Motor Vehicles. U.S. ITC Publication 3545, September 2002. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
International Trade Commission, p. 37.
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fixed set of homogeneous consumers, we will develop intuition suggesting that these firms may
optimally benefit from such moderate (e.g., the four year interval) design intervals.
Competition may induce even shorter intervals, and insufficient design resources may force
even longer intervals, but the model-driven insights suggest that the aforementioned time
intervals that we witness in practice may be quite intentional for these firms, as opposed to
being only forced by limits imposed by competitive or design considerations.
While there is a rich literature regarding markets where a product is replaced by a newer
product in a two period setting, reflecting both empirical and analytic approaches (e.g., Bayus
1992, Dhebar 1994), relatively little research has addressed how to set the time interval between
an ongoing series of new models for an evolving product. Our approach is similar to the model
originally proposed by Fishman and Rob (2000) and later extended by Plambeck and Wang
(2009). Our model is simpler in one key respect: We assume that the product technology’s rate
of improvement is fixed (i.e., linear improvement over time). For simplicity, we assume that the
rate of technology improvement is exogenous (e.g., Kornish 2001). A distinguishing feature of
our model is that it allows for post-purchase product updates, as is typical in practice for
software. Software producers commonly offer free updates between major successive releases,
and our model permits that software distribution characteristic. With increasing digitization,
post-purchase updates will likely increase in significance for other product categories over time
as well. In our model, the traditional no-updates scenario corresponds to a limiting case. At the
other extreme, a software seller could deliver value entirely through updates, meaning that the
initially purchased version provides no incremental boost in performance; this “subscription
selling” extreme is another limiting case of our model that the aforementioned papers do not
address.
The parsimonious nature of our model for optimizing the sequential timing for an
evolving product enables us to derive insights. Starting with homogeneous consumers, we
compare the limiting cases of the no-updates sales strategy (i.e., selling without interim
updates) and the continuous-updates strategy (“subscription selling”), and show that the latter
optimally yields higher profits but requires a lengthy subscription interval or a high discount
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rate. We also show that ideally (if feasible), the monopolist would sell a “lifetime” (infinite)
subscription with free updates and so extract all surplus from consumers, resulting in a profit
level nearly triple of that from selling individual models without updates. Given that the
limiting case of pure subscription may not be tenable in practice, the hybrid strategy of offering
new models that provide some front-loaded performance gains with limited post-purchase
updates is an effective via media that we see utilized in practice (by producers of digital
products, most notably software). We show that by offering new models earlier in time, with
smaller initial performance increments, and then subsequently delivering updates over time,
the monopolist increases profits relative to a no-updates strategy. Interestingly, we also find that
although pricing and profits depend on the rate of technology improvement, the monopolist’s
optimal pace of product introductions (i.e., the interval between successive products) does not.
We show that the key driver of the optimal time between successive products is the discount
rate. For most software companies, discount rates vary from 20% to 70% (Allen and Rigby 2003),
depending on a particular firm’s market and other risk factors, as well as the time value of
money. We show that the optimal launch interval should be driven by the inverse of the
discount rate that the firm associates with that product.
When we extend the consumer model to address heterogeneous customers, we assume
that the firm will employ a stationary policy—a constant launch interval over time—while
allowing consumers to self-select distinct upgrade frequencies depending on their product
valuations. High valuation customers will continue to purchase every new release, whereas
others may purchase only every other (or every third, etc.) version, thus skipping over some
releases. Consumer “skipping” and the resultant disparate purchase frequencies significantly
complicates the firm’s decision problem, even given a constant launch interval. We derive a
bound on the firm’s optimal profit. Given a heterogeneous customer base, we use that bound to
analyze the firm’s policy and demonstrate that when determining the product launch interval,
the firm can achieve near-optimal profits by focusing exclusively on relatively high valuation
customers—specifically, those who are expected to purchase at least every other model. We
even find that if the firm sets the launch interval by specifically targeting only the
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high-valuation consumers expected to purchase each new product release (as in the
homogeneous setting), the resulting profit loss is not severe. This robustness supports the
significance of the insights that we can derive from the simpler homogeneous-consumer case.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section III.2 we review the related
literature. Section III.3 details our specific assumptions and develops our base-case “hybrid”
model for sequential and updateable products over time, and defines the two associated
limiting cases: (i) the no-updates case, and (ii) the continuous-updates case. Section III.4
compares the different update policies. Section III.5 extends the definition of the customer base
to address heterogeneity in consumers’ product valuations, and describes the bounding
methodology for assessing the firm’s profits. Section III.6 concludes.
III.2. Literature Review
Studying the sales of durable goods calls for consideration of time, given that the defining
feature of a durable good is that it persists in time—in contrast with a short-lived consumable
good. The time element complicates the selling of durable goods considerably. The added
complexity essentially results from two sources: (i) the potential that consumers might opt to
wait rather than purchase at the current time, and (ii) the potential that the firm might
optimally renege on its initial selling plan. The buy-now versus wait decision is referred to as
“strategic” or forward-looking behavior, and reflects rational decision making for the consumer
(Coase 1972). Consumers may defer their purchase in anticipation of either a better product or
a lower price. The potential for the firm to renege on its initial sales plan is referred to as time
inconsistency, which may occur even in deterministic settings and be detrimental to the firm
(Bulow 1982). The firm may (predictably) renege on its initial sales plan by exploiting, in a later
period, the fact that earlier consumer purchases are fixed with associated sunk expenditures.
Given the themes of forward-looking consumers and time inconsistency, the research literature
on durable goods has two emphases. The first explores price discrimination tactics, both at a
fixed point in time (static, across vertically differentiated products) and across time
(intertemporal), given the forward-looking consumers. The second explores tactics for avoiding
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the time inconsistency problem, or at least mitigating its effects. We next review the literature
pertaining to these two themes.
The durable goods literature focusing on pricing address the two aforementioned reasons
that strategic consumers may defer their purchase: (i) waiting for a lower price, or (ii) waiting
for a better product. The former rationale reflects the outcome conjectured by Coase (1972),
which was the catalyst for a subsequent stream of pricing research addressing a durable good
with fixed quality over time—including Stokey (1981), Landsberger and Meilijson (1985), Gul
et al. (1986), and Besanko and Winston (1990). The latter rationale applies when product quality
improves in time, such as in Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001), who considered a two period
model with heterogeneous customers and explore the resulting equilibrium conditions, both
with and without upgrade pricing. These papers assume that there is a single product available
at any point in time. Levinthal and Purohit (1989) addressed pricing, including buy-back
strategies, when an improved product may be sold alongside the older product in the second
period. For two distinct customer types, Lee and Lee (1998) also addressed the potential to sell
the old and new products in parallel in the second period, but they considered upgrade pricing
and analyzed the conditions under which it is profitable for the firm to innovate. Assuming a
continuum of heterogeneous consumers, Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) studied upgrade pricing
in a similar two-period context with the old and new product selling in parallel, and analyzed
the impact of secondhand market. In these papers, the product design improves over time, in
contrast with Moorthy and Png (1992), who considered sequencing a high quality model
followed by a low quality model.
The durable goods literature contains a stream of research focused on the issue of how a
firm can gain “commitment power” and so mitigate the profit losses resulting from time
inconsistency. Early research in this vein considered the ability to use leasing as a means to
avoid time inconsistency. Bulow (1986) considered a two-period model where products may
become physically obsolete in the second period (due to durability issues), and showed that the
firm can increase profits via leasing, by avoiding time inconsistency. Waldman (1993, 1996) also
showcased the leasing benefit in a two-period context, in which the firm has the incentive in the
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second period to overinvest in product quality—as opposed to quantity as in the Bulow (1986)
model. These papers suggest a distinction between physical versus economic obsolescence. The
ability for a producer to create the latter raises the time inconsistency issue, whereas the
presence of the former can help a producer avoid the ill effects of time inconsistency. Huang
et al. (2001) showed that when a firm sells a single product over time, then time inconsistency
issues can be avoided if that product has limited physical durability, making leasing potentially
less profitable than selling. Morita and Waldman (2004) showed that by monopolizing the
maintenance market for its own product, the firm can reduce or eliminate problems due to time
inconsistency, similar to leasing. Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2005) employed a two-period model to
prove that a combination of selling and leasing can be optimal for a firm whose durable good is
used in conjunction with a consumable good offered by a separate firm. Gilbert and
Jonnalagedda (2011) analyzed, in a similar setting, when the firm will benefit from making its
product compatible with the other firm’s complementary offerings, versus using
incompatibility as a mechanism to tie consumers to its own complementary goods.
Durable goods research also addresses issues other than those of forward-looking
consumers and time inconsistency. Rather than construct demand via a utility-based model of
rational individual choice, Bayus (1992) employed a diffusion demand model, related to that of
Norton and Bass (1987), to address the pricing of two (overlapping) successive product
generations. Likewise, Krankel et al. (2006) employed a diffusion model to evaluate the
demands for successive product introductions, assuming technology improves stochastically.
Krankel et al. noted a drawback of not modeling consumer choice: “A limitation of our analysis
is that the model does not consider . . . the firm’s pace of product introductions may cause
consumers to postpone purchase decisions . . . .” Specifically for software, Wu and Chen (2008)
considered a single firm, product, and point in time, to determine the optimal number of
variations (versions) of that product to combat software piracy. The resulting nonlinear
mixed-integer programming model reflects a static product-line design problem. Bhargava and
Choudhary (2008) also considered vertical price discrimination for a software seller, with fixed
sunk costs and an exogenous quality constraint, finding that versioning is optimal when the
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optimal market share of the lower-quality version, offered alone, is greater than the optimal
market share of the high-quality version, offered alone.
The aforementioned papers are limited to considering two specific time periods, or do not
consider time at all, and therefore do not permit an analysis of the timing (interval setting)
between successive product versions. Research addressing the timing of successive
introductions is quite sparse in the durable goods literature. Balcer and Lippman (1984)
addressed stochastic product improvements over an extend (infinite) horizon, with exogenous
technology constraints, but took the viewpoint of a firm as the demander of its own innovations
and so did not address strategic consumer behavior (e.g., version skipping). Fishman and Rob
(2002) and, in a closely related paper, Plambeck and Wang (2009) leveraged a deterministic
model to consider a series of new product introductions over an infinite horizon, with strategic
and homogeneous consumers. Using that framework, Fishman and Rob (2002) contrasted a
traditional seller’s profits with those under licensing and upgrade-pricing options. They showed
that these latter tactics can extract full consumer surplus because the firm can set its price equal
to a consumer’s valuation of the product and the consumer, even if forward-looking, cannot
benefit from skipping over a model offering (due to either their license expiring or having to pay
a correspondingly higher price). Plambeck and Wang (2009) used the same framework to show
conditions under which the monopolist seller’s equilibrium policy is unique, and then extended
the framework to show that under duopoly competition the pace of product introductions will
accelerate and thus reduce social welfare. In regards to the competitive outcome, and
motivated by e-waste initiatives, they analyzed two legislative options (a fee upon sale, and a fee
upon disposal) to help slow the pace of introductions and help restore social welfare. Our work
leverages the same framework—a series of new product introductions over a deterministic and
infinite horizon, with strategic consumers—with the purpose of understanding the key drivers
of the optimal pacing (timing) for the firm’s sequential product versions.
We extend the framework to consider the possibility, as commonly occurs with software
sales, that the seller can periodically sell new versions while offering interim (“free”) updates.
Moreover, we subsequently extend the framework to consider consumer heterogeneity in
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product valuation and how the firm’s pace of introductions will naturally cause lower-valuation
consumers to, as described in Dhebar’s (1996) Observation 1, “. . . decide against switching
(“upgrading”) to the new version when it is introduced.” Related to this point is Dhebar’s
Observation 2: “The later the new version is introduced, the more willing owners of the existing
version are to adopt the new version.” Consistent with these observations, when addressing
heterogeneity, we allow consumers to decide against upgrading, if the pace of product
introductions is too rapid. In contrast with our approach of permitting consumers to have
different upgrade frequencies (e.g., purchasing every, or every other, version), Plambeck and
Wang (2009) made the following assumption: “Suppose that the firm marks down its price
sufficiently rapidly to sell to all prospective consumers before the next new product is
introduced . . . .” Like Fishman and Rob (2002) and Plambeck and Wang (2009), we restrict the
seller to a stationary policy for simplicity. And, to accommodate our consideration of both the
possibility of interim product (e.g., downloadable software) updates and heterogeneous
consumers’ varying update frequencies, we simplify the modeling of technology improvements
over time. Specifically, whereas Fishman and Rob (2002) modeled the (nonlinear) technology
improvements as endogenous investment decisions, we assume a fixed rate of product
improvement over time, essentially treating the firm’s technology investments as sunk costs
when making the launch timing decisions.
III.3. The Model
Consider a monopolist firm selling an improvable durable good, such as packaged
software,2 to a continuum of infinitely lived consumers. Consumers are homogeneous in
valuation of the software. The utility or service value a representative consumer derives from
using the software depends on the quality of the software. The software delivers continuous
stream of service value at m per unit time. Note that m can also be interpreted as the rate of
product innovation. We assume that the fixed cost for the firm is constant and so is normalized
2For expositional convenience, we use packaged software, e.g., Microsoft Office, as a representative product of the
improvable durable good. The results derived for packaged software also apply to other improvable durable goods.
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to zero. The variable cost is negligible and the firm has unlimited capacity. Due to ongoing R&D,
the software improves gradually. The firm can release a new version whenever desired. The new
and improved version offers greater value, but consumers may continue to use the current
version. The firm can release a new version when there is an update, or wait until a major
update (or upgrade) is ready.3 Denote the new version “front-load ratio” by θ ∈ [0,1]. A
front-load ratio of 1 means that the firm waits until a new version release is 100% complete
before the release date. A front-load ratio of 0 means that the firm starts selling each new
version immediately when there is no performance gain compared to the previous version, and
the firm provides continuous post-sale updates until the next version release.
The value of θ corresponds to the firm’s different product release policies: partial-updates
policy (0≤ θ ≤ 1), continuous-updates policy (θ = 0), or no-updates policy (θ = 1). Continuous-
and no-updates policies are special cases of the partial-updates policy.
For different policies, the firm decides the interval between successive product releases,
and price, to maximize its profits. Below we analyze the three update policies.
III.3.1. Partial-updates Policy
We first consider the case where the firm adopts a partial-updates policy (0≤ θ ≤ 1). Under
the partial-updates policy, the firm releases a new version when it has accumulated fair amount
of incremental service value, which is high enough to attract consumers to purchase the new
version. After consumers purchase the new version, they receive continuous updates from the
firm. At certain point of time, the firm stops providing updates, and consumers can continue to
use the current version.
Figure III.1 illustrates the partial-updates policy. The firm releases new versions of the
software at discrete times θτ, (1+θ)τ, (2+θ)τ, . . . . Consumers pay price, p, obtain new versions
at those discrete times, and receive continuous updates until times τ, 2τ, 3τ, . . . .
3We adopt the following terminology (Microsoft 2011). An update is a released feature pack, fix, or service pack
that is used to improve or to fix a software product between the major releases of the software. An upgrade (a major
update, or a release) is “a software package that replaces an installed version of a product with a newer version of the
same product.”
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Figure III.1. Partial-updates Policy
We next formulate the firm’s decision problem. Assume that the instantaneous discount
rate, r > 0, is constant and identical for both the firm and the consumers. The firm chooses
price, p, and release interval, τ, to maximize its profits over the software’s selling horizon [0,∞).
Let Πˆ be the net present value (NPV) of the firm’s profits and Sˆ be the consumer’s surplus if the
consumer purchases the software.4
The firm’s profit maximization problem is
max
p,τ>0 Πˆ(p,τ)
:=
∞∑
n=0
pe−r (n+θ)τ (III.1)
Subject to:
Sˆ :=
∫ τ
θτ
(mt )e−r (t−θτ)d t +
∫ (1+θ)τ
τ
(mτ)e−r (t−θτ)d t −p ≥ 0. (III.2)
The objective function is an infinite sum of the NPV of the profits realized at discrete times
θτ, (1+θ)τ, (2+θ)τ, . . . . The constraint states that a consumer will purchase the software when
the surplus is nonnegative. Proposition III.1 characterizes the optimal release interval, τˆ∗.
4We use accents ˆ , ˚ , and ˜ to denote the partial-, no-, and continuous-updates policies, respectively. For example,
τˆ, τ˚, and τ˜ denote the release interval under the partial-, no-, and continuous-updates policies, respectively. When
there is no confusion from context, we will omit the accents for ease of notation.
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Proposition III.1. Under the partial-updates policy, for a given front-load ratio, θ, the firm’s
optimal release interval, τˆ∗ = c(θ)/r .
From Proposition III.1, we see that, for a given θ, r τˆ∗ = c(θ) = constant. Therefore, for a
given θ, it is r , the technological risk/uncertainty, that drives the optimal release interval, τˆ∗.
Interestingly, the optimal release interval is independent of the speed of technology innovation,
m. Figure III.2 illustrates the optimal r τˆ∗ versus the front-load ratio, θ. As can be seen from
the figure, for the same discount rate, r , as the front-load ratio, θ, decreases, the firm would
optimally delay the new product releases. For example, suppose that the firm’s discount rate is
50%.5 If the front-load ratio, θ, is 75%, the firm would set the optimal release interval equal to
2.6 years. If θ is 50%, the firm would set the optimal release interval to 3.6 years. If θ decreases to
25%, then the firm would set the release interval to 5.7 years.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
θ
rτˆ
∗
Figure III.2. Optimal r τˆ∗ versus θ (Homogeneous Consumers)
Having obtained the optimal release interval, τˆ∗, we further derive the firm’s optimal price
and optimal profit.
5For most software companies, discount rates vary from 20% to 70% (Allen and Rigby 2003).
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Proposition III.2. Under the partial-updates policy, the optimal price, pˆ∗, and the optimal profit,
Πˆ∗, are given by
pˆ∗ = m
[
1+θrτ∗−e−(1−θ)rτ∗ − rτ∗e−rτ∗]
r 2
, (III.3)
Πˆ∗ = m
[
(1+θrτ∗)e(1−θ)rτ∗ − rτ∗e−θrτ∗ −1]
r 2
(
erτ∗ −1) , (III.4)
where τ∗ = τˆ∗ = c(θ)/r , which is given in Proposition III.1.
From Proposition III.2, we see that, unlike the optimal release interval, τˆ∗, the optimal
price, pˆ∗, and the optimal profit, Πˆ∗, are dependent on the speed of technology innovation, m.
We next study two special cases of the partial-updates policy: the no-updates policy (θ = 1), and
the continuous-updates policy (θ = 0).
III.3.2. No-updates Policy
The no-updates policy is a special case (θ = 1) of the partial-updates policy. Under the
no-updates policy, the firm has to release a “state-of-the-art” software package to attract
consumers to purchase it. After consumers purchase the current version, they can continue to
use the software, without getting any “free” updates from the firm. All the updates and new
features will be included in the next major version release. An example of no-updates release
would be the one-time software in CD-ROM format.
Figure III.3 illustrates the no-updates policy. Consumers pay price, p, and obtain new
versions at discrete times τ, 2τ, 3τ, . . . . Consumers receive no “free” updates from the firm after
they purchase the software.
Let Π˚ be the NPV of the firm’s profits and S˚ be the consumer’s surplus if the consumer
purchases the software. Under the no-updates policy, the firm’s profit maximization problem is
max
p,τ>0 Π˚(p,τ)
:=
∞∑
n=1
pe−r nτ (III.5)
Subject to:
S˚ :=
∫ τ
0
(mτ)e−r t d t −p ≥ 0. (III.6)
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Figure III.3. No-updates Policy
Proposition III.3. Under the no-updates policy, the firm’s optimal release interval, τ˚∗ = 1/r .
From Proposition III.3, we see that the optimal release interval, τ˚∗, decreases with the
discount rate, r . Intuitively, if technological risk is low (i.e., low discount rate), to earn higher
profits, the firm would defer the releases of new versions. In other words, lower discount rate
yields higher profits by allowing the firm to slow the rate of product introductions.
The optimal price, p˚∗, and the optimal profit, Π˚∗, can be readily derived. The results are
presented in Proposition III.4.
Proposition III.4. Under the no-updates policy, the optimal price, p˚∗, and the optimal profit, Π˚∗,
are given by
p˚∗ = (e−1)m
er 2
, (III.7)
Π˚∗ = m
er 2
. (III.8)
III.3.3. Continuous-updates Policy
The continuous-updates policy is another special case (θ = 0) of the partial-updates policy.
Under the continuous-updates policy, the firm adopts so-called “subscription selling,” in which
the firm charges customers up-front price, and customers obtain future incremental service
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value through continuous updates. This is analogous to magazine subscription—consumers
pay annual subscription fee before they receive the first issue of the magazine. In software
industry, SaaS (Software as a Service) providers generally require that customers pay a
subscription fee for their services such as cloud computing.
Figure III.4 illustrates the continuous-updates policy. Under this policy, consumers pay
price, p, at discrete times 0, τ, 2τ, 3τ, . . . , and receive continuous updates from the firm.
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Figure III.4. Continuous-updates Policy
Let Π˜ be the NPV of the firm’s profits and S˜ be the consumer’s surplus if the consumer
purchases the software. Under the continuous-updates policy, the firm’s profit maximization
problem is
max
p,τ>0 Π˜(p,τ)
:=
∞∑
n=0
pe−r nτ (III.9)
Subject to:
S˜ :=
∫ τ
0
(mt )e−r t d t −p ≥ 0. (III.10)
Proposition III.5. Under the continuous-updates policy:
(i) The firm charges consumers up-front for a lifetime of ensuing updates.
(ii) The maximum profit the firm can get is m/r 2.
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(iii) The firm extracts all the value accrued by the consumers.
Define V :=m/r 2. Hence, V is the maximum value a consumer can obtain from using the
software, and it is also the maximum profit that the firm can extract from the consumer. By
contrast, under the no-updates policy, the firm can extract only a fraction (1/e ≈ 37%) of the
maximum profit, V .
III.4. Comparing Update Policies
III.4.1. Comparing Continuous- and No-updates Policies
From Proposition III.4, we see that, under the no-updates policy, the firm captures the
optimal profit, Π˚∗ = m/(er 2). By contrast, under the continuous-updates policy, the firm
captures the optimal profit, Π˜∗ = m/r 2, which is also the maximum value (V ) that consumers
can get from using the software. Therefore, the no-updates policy extracts only a fraction (37%)
of the maximum value.6 However, to capture the maximum profit, V , the firm needs to charge
consumers up-front for a lifetime (Recall that consumers are infinitely lived). We want to
compare the profits from the continuous-updates policy and the no-updates policy when the
firm uses the same finite release interval. First, we will show that, using the same τ˚∗, which is
the optimal release interval for the no-updates policy, the continuous-updates policy is more
profitable. This result is formally presented in Proposition III.6.
Proposition III.6. Assume that the firm uses the same release interval, τ˚∗, then the continuous-
updates policy yields higher profit than the no-updates policy.
The result in Proposition III.6, however, does not necessarily carry over to the case where
an arbitrary release interval, τ, is used for both the continuous- and the no-updates policies. In
fact, if the firm uses the same τ for both policies, depending on the discount rate, r , the profit
from the continuous-updates policy could be greater than, equal to, or less than that from the
no-updates policy, as shown in Proposition III.7.
6Π˚∗/V = Π˚∗/Π˜∗ = 1/e ≈ 37%.
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Proposition III.7. Assume that the firm uses the same arbitrary release interval, τ, for both the
continuous- and no-updates policies. Then for a fixed τ:
(i) There exists a threshold discount rate, r¯ , at which the profits from the two policies are equal.
(ii) The threshold discount rate, r¯ , solves the equation erτ+ rτe−rτ−2rτ−1= 0.
(iii) If r < r¯ , the no-updates policy dominates, i.e., Π˚> Π˜; If r > r¯ , the continuous-updates policy
dominates, i.e., Π˜> Π˚.
From the proof of Proposition III.7, we see that the threshold discount rate, r¯ , satisfies
r¯τ ≈ 0.84. Interestingly, this critical value is independent from m, the rate of technology
innovation. If we draw r¯τ≈ 0.84 in the (r,τ) space, we obtain an indifference curve, as shown in
Figure III.5. We can think of Figure III.5 as a policy map for the firm: (i) the indifference curve
gives the (r,τ) combinations at which the continuous- and no-updates policies yield equal
profits; (ii) for a given product release interval, τ, as we consider higher discount rates, the value
of releasing products earlier increases, thus favoring the continuous-updates policy. Hence, in
the (r,τ) policy map, points to the right of the curve correspond to where the
continuous-updates policy is optimal. Similarly, points to the right of the curve correspond to
where the no-updates policy is optimal; (iii) for discount rates in the range of 15–25%, as long as
the release interval, τ < 3 years, the no-updates policy is preferable. We see, however, that the
combination (r = 25%,τ= 3) falls (nearly) on the curve, implying that if either the interval, τ, or
the discount rate, r , increases, the firm could benefit from switching to the continuous
policy—if feasible for its product and market.
III.4.2. Comparing All Three Policies
We now compare the profits under all three update policies. We define the maximum profit
that the firm can attract from the consumers under the continuous-updates policy as an upper
bound, V . Also notice that the optimal release interval under the continuous-updates policy is
equal to infinity. As we have shown in Proposition III.5, V also represents the maximum value
that consumers derive from the product under the continuous-updates policy.
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Figure III.5. Indifference Curve for Update Policies
Proposition III.8. We have the following results regarding the firm’s profits:
(i) V =m/r 2, which corresponds to the firm’s profit under continuous-updates policy, is also the
maximum profit that the firm can get from the consumers under all three update policies.
(ii) Πˆ∗ > Π˚∗; that is, the profit under partial-updates policy must be greater than that under the
no-updates policy.
Figure III.6 shows the firm’s profits under different update policies. The top curve
represents the NPV of the value that the product delivers to consumers, V =m/r 2. The bottom
two curves show what fraction of that value the firm can derive under the partial- and
no-updates policies.
We found that: (i) the traditional software release scheme (periodic releases without
updates in between, i.e., no-updates policy) extracts only a fraction (as noted earlier, 37%) of
the product value, V ; (ii) as θ decreases from 1, the profit curve for the hybrid policy increases
and accelerates, implying that the marginal gain from providing more continuous updates is
increasing; (iii) in the limit, if the firm could exercise subscription selling (i.e., θ = 0), only then
can the firm earn the full value from its product.
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Figure III.6. Profit versus θ (r = 0.3)
These findings lend us some insights into the product design. If the firm can design the
product to permit updates to be delivered post-sale as per the continuous-updates policy, then
the firm can extract significantly more value from customers. In practice, we see many products
designed as hardware with embedded, upgradable firmware or software, e.g., auto GPS with
lifetime map updates.
We next fix θ = 25%, and compare the profits under the no-updates and the partial-updates
policies. Figure III.7 shows how profits change with the value of the discount rate, r . We see that
the three policies’ optimal profits are decreasing in r . We have shown that Π˚∗/V is equal to the
fixed ratio (37%), and the ratio is independent from m, and r . From the numerical results (not
reported here), we see that, for θ = 25%, Πˆ∗ ≈ 74%V , and Πˆ∗/Π˚∗ ≈ 2. In other words, for θ = 25%,
the firm extracts approximately 74% of the product value from consumers and the profit from
the partial-updates policy nearly double that from the no-updates policy. For a given θ, we can
show that Πˆ∗/V is a constant, which is independent from the technology innovation rate, m, and
the discount rate, r . This result is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition III.9. For a given θ, Πˆ∗/V = constant.
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III.5. Extension to Heterogeneous Consumers
We now extend our model to address heterogeneity in the consumer population. We
assume that consumer’s valuation is uniformly distributed over [0, M ] with density φ, where
M ,φ> 0. Due to the assumptions of the linear trajectory of technology improvement and equal
release intervals, some consumers will purchase every version, while some consumers will
purchase every other version, etc. We consider all those consumers with purchasing
frequencies at least every N -th version, and N can be large. For example, for N = 3, we consider
all consumers who would purchase every, every other, or every third version. Let mk be the
valuation of a consumer who is indifferent between purchasing every k-th versions and every
(k +1)-st version, where 1≤ k < N . The firm captures profit pik by selling to consumer segment
[mk ,mk−1]. Figure III.8 illustrates consumer segments and their purchasing frequencies.
Consider a consumer who purchases every k-th version. The undiscounted incremental
service value that the consumer obtains from using the product is the infinite sum of the shaded
regions, as shown in Figure III.9.
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Figure III.9. Consumers Purchase Every k-th Version
Let ak be the discounted area (discounted back to time point (k − 1+ θ)τ) of the shaded
region Ak .
ak :=
∫ kτ
(k−1+θ)τ
(mt )e−r [t−(k−1+θ)τ] d t +
∫ (2k−1+θ)τ
kτ
(mkτ)e−r [t−(k−1+θ)τ] d t .
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Let Sk be consumer’s surplus (discounted back to time 0) if the purchasing frequency is
1
kτ .
Sk :=
∞∑
n=1
ak e
−r (kn−1+θ)τ−
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (kn−1+θ)τ.
The indifferent consumer’s valuation, mk , solves the equation Sk = Sk+1. Equating Sk and
Sk+1 and solving for m:
mk :=m =
pr 2 (erτ−1)
D+E , (III.11)
where
D = rτe−krτ−krτe(1−k)rτ+krτe−2krτ− (k+1)rτe−(2k+1)rτ+ (k+1)rτe−(k+1)rτ,
E = erτ[(θ+k−1)rτ+1]+e(θ−1)rτ−eθrτ− (θ+k)rτ−1.
Lemma III.1 gives a threshold for the optimal release interval, τ∗, for a given discount rate, r .
Lemma III.1. Assume that consumers are heterogeneous in valuation and that consumers’
valuation is continuous on [0, M ]. Then the optimal release interval, τ∗, satisfies rτ∗ > ln2.
Lemma III.2 characterizes consumer’s valuation, mk .
Lemma III.2. Consumer’s valuation, mk , has the following properties:
(i) mk >mk+1; that is, mk monotonically decreases in k.
(ii) mk → 0 as k →∞.
Next we solve the firm’s profit maximization problem. For simplicity, we first consider the
case in which consumers purchase every version or do not purchase any version, then consider
the case in which consumers purchase every, every other version, or do not purchase any version.
Later, we will extend to cases in which consumers have other purchasing frequencies.
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III.5.1. Case 1: Consumers Purchase Every Version, or Do Not Purchase Any Version
Firm’s profit maximization problem when consumers purchase every version or do not
purchase any version is given by
max
p,τ>0 Π1(p,τ)
:= (M −m1)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (n−1+θ)τ (III.12)
Subject to:
M >m1 > 0. (III.13)
Case 1a: θ = 1.
Consider the special case where θ = 1, which is the no-updates model with heterogeneous
consumers.
The firm’s profit maximization problem now becomes
max
p,τ>0 Π1(p,τ)
:= (M −m1)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r nτ (III.14)
Subject to:
M >m1 > 0. (III.15)
For this special case with θ = 1, we have
mk =
pr (erτ−1)e(2k+1)rτ
τ
(
ekrτ−1)[e(k+1)rτ−1] [k (erτ−1)−1] . (III.16)
Hence,
m1 = pr e
3rτ
τ
(
e2rτ−1) (erτ−2) . (III.17)
Substituting m1 from (III.17) into (III.14), we have
Π1(p,τ)= pφ
erτ−1
[
M − pr e
3rτ
τ
(−erτ−2e2rτ+e3rτ+2)
]
. (III.18)
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First order conditions ∂Π1∂p = 0 and ∂Π1∂τ = 0 give
p = Mτe
−3rτ (erτ−2)(erτ−1)(erτ+1)
2r
, (III.19)
and
p = Mτ
2e−2rτ (erτ−1)(erτ−e2rτ+2)2
−6rτ−erτ+e2rτ(rτ−2)+e3rτ(rτ+1)+2 . (III.20)
By equating (III.19) and (III.20), we solve for τ∗ in terms of r . After obtaining τ∗,Π∗1 and p
∗
can be easily obtained from (III.18), (III.19), or (III.20).
Under the no-updates model, for a given discount rate, r , Proposition III.10 characterizes
the optimal release interval, τ∗.
Proposition III.10. Assume that consumer’s valuation of software is uniformly distributed over
[0, M ]. A consumer either purchases every new version, or does not purchase any version. Then,
under the no-updates policy, the optimal release interval, τ∗, satisfies rτ∗ = c1, where c1 is a
constant.
Case 1b: θ ∈ [0,1].
Now we consider the general model (θ ∈ [0,1]), which includes the continuous-, partial-,
and no-updates models. Similar to Case 1a, we solve for τ∗ in terms of r . Subsequently, we can
get p∗ and Π∗1 . The expressions for p
∗, and Π∗1 are complicated, and so are not reported here.
For general value of θ ∈ [0,1], we have similar result as in Proposition III.10. For each value
of θ, we can show that the optimal release interval, τ∗, satisfies rτ∗ = c1(θ), as depicted in
Figure III.10.
III.5.2. Case 2: Consumers Purchase Every, Every Other Version, or Do Not Purchase
Firm’s profit maximization problem when consumers purchase every version, every other
version, or do not purchase any version, is given by
max
p,τ>0 Π2(p,τ)
:= (M −m1)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (n−1+θ)τ+ (m1−m2)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (2n−1+θ)τ (III.21)
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Subject to:
M >m1 >m2 > 0. (III.22)
Following the same logic as in Case 1a, we can solve for τ∗, p∗, and Π∗2 . Proposition III.11
characterizes the optimal release interval, τ∗.
Proposition III.11. Assume that consumer’s valuation of software is uniformly distributed over
[0, M ]. A consumer purchase every, every other version, or does not purchase any version. Then,
for a given θ ∈ [0,1], the optimal release interval, τ∗, satisfies rτ∗ = c2(θ).
Figure III.11 illustrates the relationship of rτ∗ versus θ in Case 2.
It is useful to compare the optimal rτ∗ versus the front-load ratio, θ, in the cases of
homogeneous and heterogeneous consumers. Figure III.12 shows the three curves, which are
from Figures III.2, III.10, and III.11, for the optimal rτ∗ versus θ in the cases of homogeneous
and heterogeneous consumers. From Figure III.12, we observe that, for given front-load ratio, θ,
and discount rate, r , the optimal launch interval in heterogeneous consumers, Case 1, is greater
than that in heterogeneous consumers, Case 2. We also observe that, for given front-load ratio,
θ, and discount rate, r , the optimal launch interval in homogeneous consumers case is smaller
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Figure III.11. Optimal rτ∗ versus θ (Heterogeneous Consumers, Case 2)
than those in heterogeneous consumers cases. These can be intuitively explained as follows. In
Case 1, the firm targets only one consumer segment, to prevent the “skipping” behavior of the
consumers, the firm slows down the pace of new version releases (i.e., increases the launch
interval) so that it is costly for the consumer to skip a version. For the homogeneous consumers
case, the optimal release interval is independent of consumer’s valuation, m, which can be
anywhere between 0 and M . Because of consumer’s “skipping” behavior, in the heterogeneous
consumers cases, the firm has to increase the release interval.
Lemma III.3. Assume that consumer’s valuation of software is uniformly distributed over [0, M ].
A consumer either purchases every, every other version, or does not purchase any version. Then,
for a given θ, the proportions of consumers in [m1, M ] and [m2,m1] are fixed and independent of
the discount rate, r .
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III.5.3. Upper Bound on Firm’s Profit
Consider consumers purchase up to every N versions, where N is a big positive integer. The
firm’s profit maximization problem is given by
max
p,τ>0 ΠN (p,τ)
:= (M −m1)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (n−1+θ)τ+ (m1−m2)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (2n−1+θ)τ
+ (m2−m3)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (3n−1+θ)τ+ (m3−m4)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (4n−1+θ)τ
+·· ·+ (mk−1−mk )φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (kn−1+θ)τ
+·· ·+ (mN−1−0)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (N n−1+θ)τ. (III.23)
Subject to:
M >m1 >m2 > ·· · >mk−1 >mk > ·· · >mN−1 > 0.
An upper bound on ΠN is provided in Proposition III.12.
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Proposition III.12. An upper bound on ΠN (p,τ), denoted by ΠUN (p,τ), is given by
ΠUN (p,τ) :=φpe(1−θ)rτ
(
M −m1
erτ−1 +
m1
e2rτ−1
)
. (III.24)
We next compute the profit upper bound, ΠUN , and compare it with the profits Π
∗
1 and Π
∗
2
derived in Sections III.5.1 and III.5.2. The results are shown in Figure III.13 and Table III.1.
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From Figure III.13, we observe that the profit upper bound,ΠUN , is pretty tight compared to
the optimal profit, Π∗2 , derived in Case 2. The managerial insight is that when determining the
product launch interval, the firm can achieve near-optimal profits by focusing only on high
valuation customers—specifically, those who are expected to purchase every, or every other
version. The optimal profit that the firm can achieve when considering only those high
valuation customers who purchase every, or every other version can be 99.88% of the upper
bound profit when the front-load ratio θ = 0.1, 94.51% when θ = 0.7, and 93.46% when θ = 1
(See Table III.1 for details). We also observe that if the firm sets the launch interval by targeting
only the highest-valuation customers who are expected to purchase each new product release
(as in the homogeneous market case), the resulting profit loss is not severe if the front-load
ratio, θ, is high (e.g., θ ≥ 0.7). The robustness of this heterogeneous-consumer model highlights
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the importance of the insights that we have derived from the simpler homogeneous-consumer
model.
Table III.1. Comparing Optimal Profits Π∗1 and Π
∗
2 with Profit Upper Bound Π
U
N
θ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Π∗1 (×M 2φ) 0.87 0.74 0.63 0.55 0.48 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.23
Π∗2 (×M 2φ) 1.50 1.18 0.94 0.77 0.63 0.52 0.44 0.36 0.31 0.26
ΠUN (×M 2φ) 1.50 1.19 0.96 0.79 0.66 0.55 0.46 0.39 0.33 0.28
Π∗1 /Π
U
N (%) 58.02 62.23 65.93 69.45 72.95 76.41 79.65 82.30 83.86 83.75
Π∗2 /Π
U
N (%) 99.88 99.25 98.22 97.08 96.02 95.16 94.51 94.05 93.72 93.46
III.6. Conclusions
The motivation for our study came from the observation in the software industry. We
noticed that, on average, every two to three years, Microsoft releases a new version of Windows
or Office software package. Why is this frequency? What are the drivers in determining the
release frequency and the price? In this chapter, we have attempted to answer these questions.
We considered a monopolist firm selling successive versions of an improvable durable
good, such as packaged software, to a continuum of consumers. The firm decides the time
between successive product introductions, and price. In turn, consumers strategically decide
whether to purchase the current version, or wait for a subsequent version. We tried to
understand how the monopolist would time and price its new product versions to extract the
maximum profit from the upgrading set of customers over time.
We first considered a market with homogeneous consumers. We constructed a unified
model that encompasses three different strategies for offering successive product versions: the
partial-, continuous-, and no-updates policies, and then analyzed the firm’s time (and price)
decisions. We found that although price and profit depend on the rate of technology
improvement, the monopolist’s optimal pace of product introductions (i.e., the release interval
between successive product versions) does not. We showed that the key driver of the optimal
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release interval is the discount rate or technological risk that the firm associates with the
product.
We compared the limiting cases of the no-updates policy and the continuous-updates
policy (“subscription selling”), and found that the profit level from the continuous-updates
policy nearly triples that from the no-updates policy. Since the continuous-updates policy (pure
subscription policy) may be unrealistic in practice, we considered a hybrid strategy (i.e., the
partial-updates policy) of offering new models that provide some front-loaded performance
gains along with limited post-purchase updates. We showed that by offering new models earlier
in time, with smaller initial performance increments, and then subsequently delivering updates
over time, the monopolist increases profits relative to a no-updates policy.
We then extended our model to heterogeneous market. We assumed that consumers are
heterogeneous in product valuation. Consumers can choose their upgrading frequencies based
on their product valuations. We developed an upper bound on the firm’s optimal profits. Given
a heterogeneous customer base, we used that bound to analyze the firm’s policy and found that
the firm can achieve near-optimal profits by focusing exclusively on relatively high valuation
customers—specifically, those who are expected to purchase at least every other version. We
also found that if the firm sets the launch interval by targeting only the consumers with the
highest valuation (those who are expected to purchase each new version, as in the
homogeneous-consumer model), the resulting profit loss is not severe if the initial performance
gain is relatively high (e.g., 70% performance gain).
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CHAPTER IV
VALUE OF INFORMATION SHARING IN A SUPPLY CHAIN
IV.1. Introduction
The stream of literature on the value of information sharing within a supply chain was
initiated in the late 1990s. A typical model setup is as follows. In a two-stage supply chain with
one manufacturer and one retailer, the retailer orders from the manufacturer and satisfies the
external customer demand. There exists a central planner, whose job is to optimize the
performance of the entire supply chain, e.g., minimize the overall supply chain cost. The
literature typically compares two options based on the information structure: demand
information (or inventory status) experienced by the retailer is visible versus hidden to the
manufacturer. By allowing the manufacturer to have access to the demand/inventory
information at the retailer, we expect that the performance of the supply chain may improve
(e.g., the overall supply chain cost may decrease). The value of demand/inventory information
is measured by the improvement in the supply chain performance. When evaluating the value
of information sharing, the literature often differs on the assumptions of the underlying
demand processes, e.g., independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) demand in Chen (1998),
Gavirneni et al. (1999), and Cachon and Fisher (2000), integrated moving average IMA(1,1)
demand in Graves (1999), autoregressive AR(1) demand in Lee et al. (2000) and Raghunathan
(2001), autoregressive moving average ARMA(1,1) demand in Gaur et al. (2005). Although these
studies differ on demand model specifications, they share one thing in common—the demand
processes are homoscedastic, i.e., the demand variances in these demand processes remain
constant over time.
The motivation of this paper is two-fold. First, we wish to study the value of information
sharing in a two-stage supply chain under heteroscedastic demand models (i.e., the conditional
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variance of the demand changes over time). While the homoscedastic demand models may be
more tractable, they are restrictive and may not be valid in practice. Some earlier empirical
studies revealed the heteroscedasticity behavior in the demand process for air transport service
(Adrangi et al. 2001), and tourism (Chan et al. 2005). Zhang (2007) showed that
heteroscedasticity is a common phenomenon in industrial demand process, especially at more
disaggregated levels. Datta et al. (2009) analyzed 70 weeks of historical demand data from a
major US retailer and found that heteroscedastic demand models give smaller forecasting error
than homoscedastic demand models. They also analyzed spare parts inventory management in
a supply chain and reached the same conclusion. Given these pieces of evidence, it seems
important to study the value of information sharing under heteroscedastic demand models.
Although heteroscedasticity models have been extensively used in the finance and economic
fields (Bollerslev et al. 1992), the operations and supply chain management literature that
incorporates temporal heteroscedasticity in the demand process is scant. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to study the value of information sharing in a supply
chain under heteroscedastic demand models. Second, under homoscedastic demand models,
the benefits resulting from information sharing vary widely in different studies, e.g., 0% in
Graves (1999), 0% to 9% in Chen (1998), and 10% to 90% in Gavirneni et al. (1999). Under
heteroscedastic demand models, we wish to investigate when information sharing is most
beneficial and when it is only marginally beneficial. In particular, does the presence of demand
heteroscedasticity lead to increased value of information sharing? What are the effects of
demand heteroscedasticity on the value of information sharing?
In this paper, we consider a nonlinear demand model based on exponential disturbances,
coupled with temporal heteroscedasticity. The proposed demand model permits the conditional
variance of the demand process to respond in distinct manners to small and large shocks. The
model allows for both demand autocorrelation and demand heteroscedasticity. We term this
model as the AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity Demand (ARCHD) model.
Under the ARCHD model, we analyze the value of information sharing in a two-stage
supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer serves autocorrelated
71
heteroscedastic customer demand and the manufacturer fills the retailer’s order. We use the
same information structure as those in Raghunathan (2001) and Gaur et al. (2005). Specifically,
we consider three models: Model 1: the retailer shares the demand information with the
manufacturer; Model 2: the retailer does not share the demand information with the
manufacturer, and the manufacturer uses the entire order history from the retailer to forecast
the demand; Model 3: the retailer does not share the demand information with the
manufacturer, and the manufacturer uses the most recent orders from the retailer to forecast its
leadtime demand. We say that demand information is valuable if the conditional variance of
the manufacturer’s leadtime demand in Model 1 is less than that in Model 2 or Model 3.1
For each model setting, we quantify the variance of the leadtime demand for both the
manufacturer and the retailer. We show analytically that when the customer demand exhibits
temporal heteroscedasticity, both the retailer and the manufacturer would expect larger
variance in leadtime demand. In Model 2, we find that there is no value of information sharing
at any given time period, while in Model 3, we find that temporal heteroscedasticity by itself
does not increase the value of information sharing unless demands are correlated over time.
Analytical results show that sharing demand information can lead to a 10% to 80% variance
reduction in the manufacturer’s leadtime demand, and hence in the manufacturer’s safety stock
level when demand exhibits strong autocorrelation and temporal heteroscedasticity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section IV.2 introduces a two-stage supply
chain based on the ARCHD demand model. In Section IV.3, we characterize the retailer’s
ordering decision. In Section IV.4, we analyze the manufacturer’s ordering decision under
different information sharing schemes. We examine the value of information sharing in
Section IV.5. Finally, Section IV.6 concludes with a summary of key insights. All proofs are
presented in Appendix D.
1While many researchers use cost reduction as the performance measure for the value of information sharing
(Chen 2003), there is a stream of literature that uses variance reduction in leadtime demand as an alternative
performance measure. In this paper, we adopt the variance approach, which enables us to develop some analytical
results. We also examined the reduction in the manufacturer’s average cost by numerical studies and obtained the
same conclusions as with the variance approach.
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IV.2. Model Setup
The notation and framework of our model closely follow those of Lee et al. (2000) and
Raghunathan (2001), except that in our model, the external customer demand is nonlinear and
has conditional heteroscedasticity with exponential disturbances.
IV.2.1. The Demand Model
We first introduce the ARCHD model, which is a nonlinear demand model based on
exponential disturbances, coupled with temporal heteroscedasticity. Specifically, in each time
period, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the retailer faces external customer demand, D t , for a single item. We
assume that D t follows an AR(1) process
D t =µ+ρD t−1+²t , (IV.1)
where µ and ρ are constants. We restrict our attention to the case where ρ ≥ 0, as was done in
Lee et al. (2000). The disturbance term, ²t , is given by
²t =ψtηt , (IV.2)
where
ψt =ω+α²t−1+βψt−1, (IV.3)
whereω, α, and β are constants. {ηt } is a sequence of i.i.d. nonnegative random variables and ηt
has a standard exponential distribution with E[ηt ]= 1 and Var[ηt ]= 1.
The ARCHD model uses the idea of the generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models to study the dynamic structure of the demand processes.
Engle (1982) first proposed the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model to
provide a systematic framework for modeling volatility of asset return processes. Bollerslev
(1986) proposed a useful extension known as the generalized ARCH (i.e., GARCH) model in the
economics literature. The heart of the ARCH-type models is that although the unconditional
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variance of the return series is a constant, the conditional variance of the series could change
over time. In the context of demand process, (IV.1)–(IV.3) imply that the demand follows an
AR(1) process with an exponential disturbance, and that the conditional standard deviation of
the exponential disturbance is a function of its own lagged values. We note that although the
disturbances are usually assumed to be normally distributed in GARCH models, we use
exponential disturbances to ensure that (IV.2) is nonnegative for all realizations of {D t }. In this
respect, our model is similar to the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model that was
first proposed by Engle and Russell (1998) to describe the evolution of time durations for
heavily traded assets. In the ACD models, the disturbances are also assumed to be random
variables with nonnegative supports.
From the structure of the ARCHD model, it can be seen that large past shocks in demand
imply a large conditional standard deviation of the demand disturbance. Consequently, the
demand tends to assume a large value. This means that, under the ARCHD modeling
framework, large demand shocks tend to be followed by another large shock.
As a final remark in this section, we note that Chen and Lee (2009) proposed a martingale
model of forecast evolution (MMFE) to study the value of information sharing in a supply chain.
The MMFE model was first introduced as a demand model by Hausman (1969), Graves et al.
(1986), and Heath and Jackson (1994). It is flexible enough to encompass many time series
demand models as special cases. Similar to the ARCHD model, the MMFE model could also
allow the conditional variance of the demand to change over time. However, there is a
significant difference in model specification between the MMFE model and our ARCHD
approach. LetIt represent the information obtained up to and including period t . Note that in
the ARCHD model, in period t , the conditional variance of ²t+l , is given by
Var[²t+l |It ]= (ω+α²t+l−1+βψt+l−1)2, which depends on ²t+l−1 and ψt+l−1. It is clear that the
conditional variance of ²t+l is a random variable at time t if l > 1. In the MMFE model, the
conditional variance of ²t+l is unknown at time t but is assumed to be a constant. In the
ARCHD model, (IV.2)–(IV.3) becomes an MMFE model if we restrict α=β= 0 and replace ω with
ωt , which is not necessarily a constant over time.
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The statistical properties of {²t } and {D t } are given in Appendix C.
IV.2.2. The Supply Chain Model
We consider a simple two-stage supply chain with one retailer and one manufacturer. In
each time period, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the retailer faces external customer demand, D t , for a single
item. Both the retailer and the manufacturer adopt a periodic review order-up-to policy. The
inventory level is reviewed and compared with an order-up-to level in every period. Our model
follows the standard setup of the Beer Game (Sterman 1989). The sequence of events in each
period is as follows: (i) at the beginning of period t , an incoming shipment from the upstream
member is received; (ii) before the end of period t , the demand from the downstream member is
received and filled from on-hand inventory, with any excess demand backlogged; (iii) at the end
of period t , an order is placed with the upstream member.
We assume that the replenishment lead times are constants for both the retailer and the
manufacturer. Let L and l be the replenishment lead times from the external supplier to the
manufacturer, and from the manufacturer to the retailer, respectively. So an order placed by the
manufacturer at the end of period t will be received at the beginning of period t +L+1.
IV.3. The Retailer’s Order
In each period t , the retailer receives demand, D t , from the external customer and satisfies
the demand from his on-hand inventory with any excess demand backlogged. The retailer then
places an order, Yt , with the manufacturer to bring the inventory level to the order-up-to level,
St . The retailer will receive the order at the beginning of period t + l +1.
LetAt :=∑l+1i=1 D t+i be the total demand over the retailer’s lead time. And let mt and vt be
the conditional expectation and the conditional variance ofAt , respectively, given D t , D t−1, . . . .
Then, we have the following results.
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Lemma IV.1.
mt =
(
ρl+2−ρl −2ρ+ l +1)[ω+µ(1−α−β)]
(1−ρ)2(1−α−β) +
ρ
(
1−ρl+1)
1−ρ D t , (IV.4)
vt =Var[²t ]
l+1∑
i=1
(
1−ρl+2−i
1−ρ
)2
+2 Cov[²t ,²t+1]
l∑
i=1
l+1∑
j=i+1
1−ρl+2−i
1−ρ
1−ρl+2− j
1−ρ
(
α+β) j−i−1 . (IV.5)
We note that for given ρ and l , vt is constant, finite, and time-invariant due to the
covariance stationarity of ²t . The conditional variance, vt , has the following properties.
Proposition IV.1. (a) For given ω> 0, 0≤ ρ < 1, and l ≥ 0, vt |α=β=0 < vt |α+β>0.
(b) If Var[²t ] remains constant in the cases in which α = β = 0 and α+β > 0, then for given
0≤ ρ < 1 and l ≥ 0, vt |α=β=0 ≤ vt |α+β>0. The equality holds if l = 0.
In words, part (a) of Proposition IV.1 says that the conditional variance of the retailer’s
leadtime demand would be strictly higher if the demand exhibits heteroscedasticity for all lead
times, regardless of whether the demand is autocorrelated. Note that the variance of ²t is a
monotonic increasing function of α and β. To have a fair evaluation of the impact of the
demand heteroscedasticity on vt , the comparison should be carried out with the variance of ²t
remaining constant across all parameter settings. Part (b) of Proposition IV.1 says that if we keep
the variance of ²t constant in the heteroscedastic and the homoscedastic cases, the conditional
variance of the retailer’s leadtime demand is strictly higher in the presence of heteroscedasticty
than that when the demand is homoscedastic, unless the lead time is zero. In such a case, the
presence of heteroscedasticty will not cause higher conditional variance of the retailer’s
leadtime demand.
The following two examples demonstrate that the conditional variance of the retailer’s
leadtime demand is a monotonic increasing function of ρ and l , regardless of whether
heteroscedasticity is present. More importantly, the presence of heteroscedasticity in the
demand process may cause the conditional variance of retailer’s leadtime demand to be much
higher for the same level of lead time.
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Example IV.1. Let us consider the homoscedastic demand case, in whichα=β= 0. Without loss
of generality, we set ω= 1 . Then Var[²t ]= 1 and vt can be written as
vt =
1−2ρ(1+ρ)+ (1−ρ2) l +2(1+ρ)ρl+2−ρ2l+4
(1+ρ)(1−ρ)3 . (IV.6)
The level curves of vt are plotted in Figure IV.1. We see from the figure that, vt is increasing
in ρ and l , implying that the more correlated the customer demand is, or the longer the retailer’s
lead time is, the higher the conditional variance of the retailer’s leadtime demand. ♦
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Figure IV.1. Level Curves of vt with Homoscedastic Demand (α=β= 0)
Example IV.2. As a heteroscedastic demand example, consider the case in which α = 0.2 and
β= 0.6. In order to facilitate a fair comparison between this case and the previous homoscedastic
demand case, we set ω = 0.1789 so that Var[²t ] = 1 in both examples. The level curves of vt in
this heteroscedastic demand case are plotted in Figure IV.2. Although vt has a similar pattern as
in the homoscedastic demand case, vt is considerably higher for the same levels of ρ and l . For
example, when ρ = 0 and l = 8, vt is less than 10 in the homoscedastic demand case; vt is more
than doubled when demand exhibits heteroscedasticity. ♦
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Figure IV.2. Level Curves of vt with Heteroscedastic Demand (α= 0.2, β= 0.6)
We now consider the retailer’s order-up-to level and explore its dynamics under the ARCHD
model. We assume that the retailer follows a simple order-up-to policy, in which the retailer’s
order-up-to level, St , is given by
St =mt + zpvt , (IV.7)
where z is called the safety factor, the critical fractile for some desired service level. The term mt
is the expected customer demand over the retailer’s lead time, and the term z
p
vt is the safety
stock. When the total leadtime demand, At , is normally distributed, the order-up-to level, St ,
minimizes the expected inventory holding and shortage costs (see Heyman and Sobel 1984, Kahn
1987, Zipkin 2000, and Lee et al. 2000). In such a case, the optimal z∗ = Φ−1[p/(p +h)], where
h is the unit holding cost per period, p is the penalty cost per unit backlogged, and Φ(·) is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function.
In each period t , the retailer orders Yt units to satisfy demand D t and raise the inventory
level from St−1 to St . Therefore,
Yt =D t +St −St−1. (IV.8)
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From (IV.4), (IV.5), (IV.7), and (IV.8), the retailer’s order quantity Yt can be expressed as
Yt =D t + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ (D t −D t−1) , (IV.9)
which gives us the demand process facing the manufacturer.
To highlight the heteroscedasticity effect, consider the special case in which ρ = 0, α 6= 0,
and β 6= 0. We set z = 2, ω= 1, µ= 0, and l = 0. Now St is reduced to
St = 1
1−α−β +
2
1−α−β
√
1−2αβ−β2
1−2αβ−2α2−β2 .
The level curves of St are plotted in Figure IV.3. In the figure, the dotted line depicts 2α2+2αβ+
β2 = 1. The points above the dotted line do not satisfy the regularity condition 2α2+2αβ+β2 < 1
(see Appendix C). Therefore, we only need to consider the (α,β) pairs in the region below the
dotted line. It is apparent that St is increasing in both α and β, implying that the retailer would
expect larger order-up-to level in the presence of heteroscedasticity.
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Figure IV.3. Level Curves of St
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IV.4. The Manufacturer’s Order
In each period t , after the manufacturer receives and ships the retailer’s order, Yt , from his
on-hand inventory (with any excess demand backlogged), the manufacturer then places an order
with her external supplier to raise the inventory level to the order-up-to level. The manufacturer
will receive the order at the beginning of period t +L+1.
We assume that the external customer demand process and its parameters are common
knowledge to both the retailer and the manufacturer. However, the actual realizations of the
demand are private knowledge to the retailer. The retailer may choose to share or not share the
demand realizations with the manufacturer. In Section IV.4.1, we analyze the situation when the
retailer chooses to share the demand realizations with the manufacturer (Model 1). The cases
without information sharing are discussed in Section IV.4.2. In particular, in Section IV.4.2 and
Section IV.4.2, we study the case in which the manufacturer has access to the retailer’s entire
order history (Model 2) and the case in which the manufacturer uses only the most recent orders
from the retailer to forecast the demand (Model 3), respectively.
IV.4.1. With Demand Information Sharing (Model 1)
When the retailer shares the external customer’s demand realizations with the
manufacturer, the manufacturer knows both the demand information, D t , and the retailer’s
order quantity, Yt .
Let B′t :=
∑L+1
i=1 Yt+i be the manufacturer’s leadtime demand when there is demand
information sharing. And let M ′t and V
′
t be the conditional expectation and the conditional
variance of B′t , respectively, given Yt , Yt−1, . . . , and D t , D t−1, . . . . Then, we have the following
results for M ′t and V
′
t .
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Lemma IV.2.
M ′t =
[
ρl+2
(
ρL+1−1)+ (1−ρ)(L+1)][(ω+µ(1−α−β)]
(1−ρ)2(1−α−β) +
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ D t , (IV.10)
V ′t =
L+1∑
i=1
(
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
)2
Var[²t+i ]
+2
L∑
i=1
L+1∑
j=i+1
(
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
)(
ξL+1− j + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1− j
)
Cov[²t+i ,²t+ j ]. (IV.11)
where
ξL+1−i :=
L+1−i∑
k=0
ρk = (1−ρL+2−i )/(1−ρ),
Var[²t+i ]=Var[²t ],
Cov[²t+i ,²t+ j ]=
(
α+β) j−i−1 Cov[²t ,²t+1].
It can be seen from (IV.11) that V ′t is also constant, finite, and time-invariant for any given values
of ρ, L, and l .
In the presence of the heteroscedasticity, the next proposition shows that the conditional
variance of the manufacturer’s leadtime demand behaves similarly as the conditional variance
of the retailer’s leadtime demand discussed in the previous section.
Proposition IV.2. (a) For given ω> 0, 0≤ ρ < 1, l ≥ 0, and L ≥ 0, V ′t |α=β=0 <V ′t |α+β>0.
(b) If Var[²t ] remains constant in the cases in which α = β = 0 and α+β > 0, then for given
0≤ ρ < 1, l ≥ 0, and L ≥ 0, V ′t |α=β=0 ≤V ′t |α+β>0. The equality holds if L = 0.
To illustrate the effect of the heteroscedasticity on the conditional variance of the
manufacturer’s leadtime demand, we consider two examples: the homoscedastic and the
heteroscedastic demand cases.
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Example IV.3. In the homoscedastic demand case, α = β = 0. Assume ω = 1 so that Var[²t ] = 1.
In this simple case, V ′t can be written as
V ′t =
(
1−ρ2) (L+1)−ρl+2 (1−ρL+1)(2+2ρ−ρl+L+3−ρl+2)
(1+ρ)(1−ρ)3 . (IV.12)
As can be seen from the level curves of V ′t (with l = 2) in Figure IV.4, V ′t is increasing in both ρ
and L. The pattern holds for other values of l . ♦
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Figure IV.4. Level Curves of V ′t with Homoscedastic Demand (α=β= 0)
Example IV.4. We now turn to the heteroscedasticity case. Assume that α = 0.2 and β = 0.6.
Further, we choose ω = 0.1789 so that Var[²t ] = 1, as in homoscedastic demand case in
Example IV.3. The level curves of V ′t (with l = 2) are plotted in Figure IV.5. We observe that V ′t is
also increasing in ρ and L as it is in the homoscedastic demand case. Although ²t in both
heteroscedastic and homoscedastic demand cases has the same variance, V ′t can still differ in
an important way: the manufacturer would expect much more variable leadtime demand if the
customer demand exhibits heteroscedasticity. Given the same levels of ρ and L, V ′t can be more
than doubled than that in the homoscedastic demand case. This is especially evident when ρ is
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Figure IV.5. Level Curves of V ′t with Heteroscedastic Demand (α= 0.2, β= 0.6)
relatively small. In such a case, heteroscedasticity plays a more important role in determining
V ′t than it does in the case in which ρ is relatively large. ♦
To analyze the manufacturer’s order-up-to level with demand information sharing, T ′t ,
consider
T ′t =M ′t +Z
√
V ′t , (IV.13)
where Z is the critical fractile for some desired service level.
IV.4.2. Without Demand Information Sharing (Models 2 and 3)
When the retailer chooses not to share the demand information with the manufacturer, the
manufacturer can use the retailer’s order history to forecast the demand. In this situation, the
manufacturer can use either the retailer’s entire order history or the retailer’s most recent orders
to forecast the demand.
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Model 2: Using Entire Order History.
Assuming that the manufacturer uses the retailer’s entire order history, i.e., Yt , Yt−1, . . . , Y1,
to forecast the demand, we can rewrite (IV.9) as
D t = 1−ρ
1−ρl+2 Yt +
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2 D t−1. (IV.14)
Using the recursive relationship of (IV.14) as did in Raghunathan (2001), we can expand D t into
D t = 1−ρ
1−ρl+2
t−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i +
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)t
D0. (IV.15)
LetBt :=∑L+1i=1 Yt+i denote the manufacturer’s leadtime demand when there is no demand
information sharing. And let Mt and Vt be the conditional expectation and the conditional
variance of Bt , respectively, given Yt , Yt−1, . . . , Y1. Then, we have the following results for Mt
and Vt .
Lemma IV.3.
Mt =
[
ρl+2
(
ρL+1−1)+ (1−ρ)(L+1)][(ω+µ(1−α−β)]
(1−ρ)2(1−α−β)
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
(1−ρ)2
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)t (
µ+ ω
1−α−β
)
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρl+2
t−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i , (IV.16)
Vt =V ′t . (IV.17)
Since Vt =V ′t , Vt is also constant, finite, and time-invariant for given ρ, L, and l .
When the manufacturer uses the retailer’s entire order history to forecast the demand, the
following proposition states that the manufacturer’s order-up-to level,
Tt =Mt +Z
√
Vt , (IV.18)
is identical to T ′t , as formally stated in Proposition IV.3.
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Proposition IV.3. The manufacturer’s order-up-to quantities are the same in the cases where (a)
the manufacturer uses the retailer’s entire order history to forecast the demand; and (b) the
manufacturer has full information about the customer demand. That is, Tt = T ′t .
The above proposition says that when the manufacturer can use the retailer’s entire order
history to forecast the demand, information sharing does not change the manufacturer’s
order-up-to quantity. Thus, the manufacturer does not benefit from information sharing in this
case. We note that Lee et al. (2000) showed that, when ρ = 0, information sharing does not
change the manufacturer’s order-up-to quantity, and provides no benefit to the manufacturer.
But their result is based on the assumption that the manufacturer uses only the most recent
order from the retailer to forecast the future orders. Here, we show that when the manufacturer
can use the retailer’s entire order history to forecast the demand, a stronger result holds:
information sharing does not change the manufacturer’s order-up-to quantity, regardless of
whether the customer demand is autocorrelated or heteroscedastic.
Model 3: Using Most Recent Orders.
Sometimes the entire order history may be unavailable to the manufacturer. In such a
case, it is a common practice for the manufacturer to use the retailer’s most recent q ≥ 1 orders,
{Yt−i }
q−1
i=0 , rather than the entire order history to forecast the demand.
Repeated use of (IV.14) yields another form of D t :
D t = 1−ρ
1−ρl+2
q−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i +
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)q
D t−q . (IV.19)
Let B˜t := ∑L+1i=1 Yt+i be the manufacturer’s leadtime demand in this scenario. And let M˜t
and V˜t be the conditional expectation and the conditional variance of B˜t when there is no
demand information sharing and only the most recent q orders are used to forecast the
demand, respectively. Then, we have the following results for M˜t and V˜t .
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Lemma IV.4.
M˜t =
[
ρl+2
(
ρL+1−1)+ (1−ρ)(L+1)][(ω+µ(1−α−β)]
(1−ρ)2(1−α−β)
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
(1−ρ)2
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)q (
µ+ ω
1−α−β
)
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρl+2
q−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i , (IV.20)
V˜t =
[
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)q]2
Var[D t ]+V ′t
=λVar[D t ]+V ′t , (IV.21)
where
λ :=
[
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)q]2
.
Since D t is covariance stationary and V ′t is constant, finite, and time-invariant, V˜t is also
constant, finite, and time-invariant for given ρ, L, and l .
The following proposition states that V˜t behaves like V ′t in that the demand
heteroscedasticity causes higher conditional variance of the manufacturer’s leadtime demand.
Proposition IV.4. For given ω> 0, 0≤ ρ < 1, l ≥ 0, L ≥ 0, and q ≥ 1, V˜t |α=β=0 < V˜t |α+β>0.
Finally, we build on the results of V˜t and show that if ρ = 0 and if the manufacturer uses
the retailer’s most recent orders to forecast the demand, information sharing does not provide
benefit to the manufacturer. Let T˜t be the manufacturer’s order-up-to level in this case. Then,
we have
T˜t = M˜t +Z
√
V˜t . (IV.22)
When ρ = 0, combining (IV.10), (IV.11), (IV.20), and (IV.21) yields M ′t = M˜t = (L+1)[µ+ω/(1−α−
β)], and V ′t = V˜t . Consequently, T ′t = T˜t by (IV.13) and (IV.22). Thus, when ρ = 0, information
sharing does not provide benefit to the manufacturer.
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IV.5. Value of Information Sharing
A common assumption in the literature on the value of information sharing is that the
manufacturer bears all the cost of ensuring reliable supply of goods to the retailer (see, e.g.,
Bourland et al. 1996, Gavirneni et al. 1999, Lee et al. 2000, Raghunathan 2001, Gaur et al. 2005,
Chen and Lee 2009). Under this assumption, the manufacturer is the beneficiary of information
sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. We make the same assumption here and
study the value of information sharing to the manufacturer only. Our first proposition on the
value of information sharing is a direct result of V ′t =Vt derived in the previous section.
Proposition IV.5. When the retailer does not share the demand information with the
manufacturer and the manufacturer uses the entire historical stream of orders from the retailer to
forecast the demand, there is no benefit of information sharing; that is, Vt =V ′t .
This result is an extension of that obtained by Raghunathan (2001), where he only
considered the conditional variance of the retailer’s demand in the next period (i.e., period
t +1), while we consider the conditional variance of the retailer’s demand in the total lead time
(i.e., from period t +1 to period t +L+1). We also note that Raghunathan’s result is based on the
demand model with Gaussian disturbances, while ours is based on the ARCHD model in which
exponential disturbances with temporal heteroscedasticity are used.
In general, when the retailer does not share the demand information with the
manufacturer and the manufacturer does not have access to all the historical orders from the
retailer, information sharing is valuable. However, if the customer demand exhibits no
correlation over time, there is no benefit of information sharing. These results are formally
presented in Proposition IV.6.
Proposition IV.6. When the retailer does not share the demand information with the
manufacturer and the manufacturer uses only the most recent orders from the retailer to forecast
the demand:
(a) there is benefit of information sharing if ρ 6= 0; that is, V ′t < V˜t if ρ 6= 0;
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(b) there is no benefit of information sharing if ρ = 0; that is, V ′t = V˜t if ρ = 0. In other words,
when ρ = 0, the manufacturer does not benefit from information sharing. Moreover, the
manufacturer does just as well using Yt , the retailer’s order in current period, to forecast the
demand.
We next devote our attention to quantifying the magnitude of the value of information
sharing. Denote by ∆ := V˜t −V ′t the reduction in the variance of the manufacturer’s order-up-to
level due to information sharing. Intuitively, ∆ can be regarded as a surrogate for the value of
information sharing. In our case, ∆=λVar[D t ] by (IV.21).
Proposition IV.7. For 0< ρ < 1, ∆ has the following properties:
(a) ∆ has no simple monotonic relationship with l ;
(b) ∆ is strictly increasing in L, ρ, ω, α, and β;
(c) ∆ is strictly decreasing in q.
Figure IV.6 illustrates how the value of∆ changes withα and β. From the figure, we observe
that ∆ increases with both α and β. In particular, we have the following result:
Corollary IV.1. For given 0< ρ < 1, l ≥ 0, L ≥ 0, q ≥ 1, and ω> 0, ∆ |α=β=0 <∆ |α+β>0.
An immediate implication of Corollary IV.1 is that if there exists heteroscedasticity in the
customer demand, the manufacturer would benefit from information sharing only when the
information of the most recent q orders from the retailer are used to forecast the demand. In
Proposition IV.5, we have shown that there is no value of information sharing when the retailer
does not share the demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses the
entire historical stream of orders from the retailer to forecast the demand. An implicit
assumption in Proposition IV.5 is that the number of the historical orders from the retailer is
finite (so that the manufacture is able to use the entire oder history from the retailer). By
contrast, if the number of the historical orders from the retailer is infinite, the following
proposition shows that the value of information sharing strictly decreases as q increases. In the
limit, as q goes to infinity, the value of information sharing converges to zero.
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Proposition IV.8. When the retailer does not share the demand information with the
manufacturer and the manufacturer uses the most recent q orders from the retailer to forecast the
demand, the benefit of information sharing vanishes if q is large enough; that is, ∆→ 0 as q →∞.
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The notion of ∆ gives us a means to quantify the reduction in the conditional variance of
the manufacturer’s leadtime demand from information sharing. To develop a sense of relative
variance reduction from information sharing, we consider the measure φ := ∆/V˜t , which is the
percentage of reduction in the variance of the manufacturer’s leadtime demand from
information sharing.
To explore the behavior of φ, in Figure IV.7, we plot the level curves of φ with respect to α
and β for a given set of parameters: l = L = 2, q = 2, ω= 1, and ρ = 0.9. Figure IV.7 indicates that
φ is increasing in α and β; that is, the relative value of information sharing tends to be higher if
the demand exhibits stronger heteroscedasticity. Figure IV.8 illustrates the impact of ρ on φ for
different values of q . We set other parameters as: l = L = 2, α= 0.3, β= 0.65, andω= 1. As shown
in the figure, φ increases as ρ increases. Figure IV.8 suggests that the manufacturer benefits a
great deal from information sharing when the demand correlation ρ is high. The percentage gain
from information sharing can be quite substantial. For example, when 0.8 < ρ < 1, φ can range
from 10% to 80%, depending on the value of q . In other words, if the manufacturer does not have
access to the retailer’s entire order history, sharing demand information can lead to a 10% to 80%
variance reduction in the manufacturer’s leadtime demand, and hence in the manufacturer’s
safety stock level when demand exhibits strong autocorrelation and temporal heteroscedasticity.
We also notice that φ strictly decreases as q increases. For example, as q increases from 2 to 5, φ
drops from 25% to 4%. In fact, φ is monotonically decreasing in q , as shown in Proposition IV.9.
Proposition IV.9. φ is strictly decreasing in q. Moreover, φ→ 0 as q →∞.
The managerial insight from Figures IV.7, IV.8 and Proposition IV.9 is that if the
manufacturer does not have access to all the historical orders from the retailer, the
manufacturer would benefit from information sharing with the retailer. The gain from
information sharing with the retailer could be quite high, especially if the underlying demand
process exhibits strong correlation and heteroscedasticity. However, if q is relatively large, the
loss due to not being able to share the information with the retailer or to have entire history of
the retailer’s orders is negligible. Indeed, through extensive computations (not reported here),
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we found that for various parameter settings, φ usually decreases in q very fast and fades to
practically zero as q ≥ 10, unless when the demand autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, is close to 1.2
IV.6. Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a nonlinear ARCHD demand model for analyzing the value of
information sharing in a two-stage supply chain. The ARCHD model provides an attractive
alternative to the homogeneous Gaussian demand model. It allows both demand
autocorrelation and temporal heteroscedasticity. In the presence of temporal heteroscedasticity
in the customer demand, both the retailer and the manufacturer would generally expect more
variable leadtime demand. We showed that information sharing is valuable only if the
manufacturer is unable to share the demand information with the retailer and does not have
access to the retailer’s entire order history. The gain of information sharing can be substantial,
especially in the presence of strong demand autocorrelations and temporal heteroscedasticity.
In such a case, information sharing can lead to a 10% to 80% variance reduction in the
2Lee et al. (2000) analyzed weekly sales data of 165 SKUs at a supermarket in a two-year period and discovered that
150 SKUs (out of 165 SKUs) have positive autocorrelation with autocorrelation coefficients varying from 0.26 to 0.89.
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manufacturer’s leadtime demand, and hence in the manufacturer’s safety stock level. However,
under the circumstance that information sharing is valuable, the value of information sharing
diminishes rapidly as q , the number of most recent orders used for demand forecasting by the
manufacturer, increases. In most of the cases with moderate strong autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity in the demand process, the gain due to information sharing is negligible if q
is relatively large. This suggests that if the manufacturer is unable to share the demand
information with the retailer and does not have access to all the historical orders, the
manufacturer should obtain as much data as possible and use all available historical orders
from the retailer in constructing demand forecasting.
Although numerous theoretical and empirical studies exist in the financial and
economical literature, demand heteroscedasticity has received little attention among the
operations and supply chain management community. Datta et al. (2009) incorporated
heteroscedastic demand into their forecasting models and obtained very encouraging results.
They proposed to bolster the concept of heteroscedasticity through pilot implementations in
other fields. Our paper is an initial effort to understand demand heteroscedasticity in the value
of information sharing in a supply chain. We believe this is a fruitful research avenue and
deserves more research attention. For example, our results could be used for investigating the
bullwhip effect in the case that the customer demand process exhibits both autocorrelation and
temporal heteroscedasticity. The existence of temporal heteroscedasticity in the customer
demand may be one of the sources that contribute to the bullwhip effect. In such a case, the
bullwhip effect may be underestimated if we assume that the demand process is homogeneous
when in fact it is not.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter II: Operations Scheduling in a Complex Manufacturing System, we studied the
scheduling problem of minimizing total weighted tardiness on parallel non-identical batch
processing machines. We first formulated the (primal) problem as a nonlinear integer
programming model. Moreover, we proved that the primal problem can be solved exactly by
solving a corresponding dual problem using the (nonlinear) penalty function method. Since
both the primal and the dual problems are NP-hard, two genetic algorithms, multiple choice
genetic algorithm (MCGA) and random keys genetic algorithm (RKGA) were proposed to
heuristically solve them. We found that both GAs consistently outperformed a standard
mathematical programming package in terms of solutions and computation times. We also
found that for small scale problem instances, MCGA outperformed RKGA, while for large scale
problem instances, RKGA outperformed MCGA.
These observations suggest that, for small scale problem instances, a better choice is to
use MCGA, while for medium and large scale problem instances, a better choice is to use RKGA.
We also found that the inefficiency of MCGA in solving large problems is caused by the empty
batches. In practice, we may run RKGA first and obtain the number of batches formed on each
machine. Then we use those numbers as inputs to MCGA. Preliminary experiments showed that
this method did improve the solution quality of MCGA and speed up the algorithm.
In Chapter III: Pricing and Timing Successive Product Releases, we considered a
monopolist firm selling successive versions of an improvable durable good, such as packaged
software, to a continuum of consumers. The firm decides the time between successive product
introductions, and price. In turn, consumers strategically decide whether to purchase the
current version, or wait for a subsequent version. We tried to understand how the monopolist
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would time and price its new product versions to extract the maximum profit from the
upgrading set of customers over time.
We first considered a market with homogeneous consumers. We constructed a unified
model that encompasses three different strategies for offering successive product versions: the
partial-, continuous-, and no-updates policies, and then analyzed the firm’s time (and price)
decisions. We found that although price and profit depend on the rate of technology
improvement, the monopolist’s optimal pace of product introductions (i.e., the release interval
between successive product versions) does not. We showed that the key driver of the optimal
release interval is the discount rate or technological risk that the firm associates with the
product.
We compared the limiting cases of the no-updates policy and the continuous-updates
policy (“subscription selling”), and found that the profit level from the continuous-updates
policy nearly triples that from the no-updates policy. Since the continuous-updates policy (pure
subscription policy) may be unrealistic in practice, we considered a hybrid strategy (i.e., the
partial-updates policy) of offering new models that provide some front-loaded performance
gains along with limited post-purchase updates. We showed that by offering new models earlier
in time, with smaller initial performance increments, and then subsequently delivering updates
over time, the monopolist increases profits relative to a no-updates policy.
We then extended our model to heterogeneous market. We assumed that consumers are
heterogeneous in product valuation. Consumers can choose their upgrading frequencies based
on their product valuations. We derived an upper bound on the firm’s optimal profits. Given a
heterogeneous customer base, we used that bound to analyze the firm’s policy and found that
the firm can achieve near-optimal profits by focusing exclusively on relatively high valuation
customers—specifically, those who are expected to purchase at least every other version. We
also found that if the firm sets the launch interval by targeting only the consumers with the
highest valuation (those who are expected to purchase each new version, as in the
homogeneous-consumer model), the resulting profit loss is not severe if the initial performance
gain is relatively high (e.g., 70% performance gain).
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In Chapter IV: Value of Information Sharing in a Supply Chain, we studied the value of
information sharing in a two-stage supply chain with nonlinear demand model, which allows
both demand autocorrelation and temporal heteroscedasticity. Under such demand model, we
considered three models based on the information sharing scheme in a two-stage supply chain
with one manufacturer and one retailer: Model 1: the retailer shares the demand information
with the manufacturer; Model 2: the retailer does not share the demand information with the
manufacturer, and the manufacturer uses the entire order history from the retailer to forecast
the leadtime demand; Model 3: the retailer does not share the demand information with the
manufacturer, and the manufacturer uses only the most recent orders from the retailer to
forecast the leadtime demand. We showed that, in the presence of temporal heteroscedasticity
in the customer demand, both the retailer and the manufacturer would generally expect more
variable leadtime demand. We found that information sharing is valuable only if the
manufacturer is unable to share the demand information with the retailer and does not have
access to the retailer’s entire order history. The gain of information sharing can be substantial,
especially in the presence of strong demand autocorrelations and temporal heteroscedasticity.
In such a case, information sharing can lead to a 10% to 80% variance reduction in the
manufacturer’s leadtime demand, and hence in the manufacturer’s safety stock level. However,
under the circumstance that information sharing is valuable, the value of information sharing
diminishes rapidly as the number of most recent orders used for demand forecasting by the
manufacturer increases. In most of the cases with moderate strong autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity in the demand process, the gain due to information sharing is negligible if
the number of most recent orders used for demand forecasting is relatively large. This suggests
that if the manufacturer is unable to share the demand information with the retailer and does
not have access to all the historical orders, the manufacturer should obtain as much data as
possible and use all available historical orders from the retailer in constructing demand
forecasting.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF STATEMENTS, CHAPTER II
Proof of Proposition II.1. Let x¯ be a feasible solution to the primal problem (P ); that is, x¯ ∈S .
So x¯ ∈X . Since x¯ ∈ S , g (x¯) ≤ 0 and h(x¯) = 0. It follows that α(x¯) = 0. The following relations
then hold for λ≥ 0:
v(PPλ)=min
x∈X
{ f (x)+λα(x)}≤ f (x¯)+λα(x¯)= f (x¯).
Since the above relations hold for all the feasible solutions to (P ), it must also hold for x∗, which
is the optimal solution to (P ). That is, v(PPλ)≤ f (x∗)= v(P ).
Proof of Lemma II.1. Since x¯ is feasible for (PPλ), x¯ ∈X . Moreover, g (x¯)≤ 0 and h(x¯)= 0. Thus
x¯ is also feasible for (P ) and α(x¯)= 0. If x¯ is ²-optimal to (PPλ), then f (x¯)+λα(x¯)≤ v(PPλ)+² by
Definition II.2. Therefore, f (x¯) ≤ v(PPλ)+ ². It follows that f (x¯) ≤ v(P )+ ² since v(PPλ) ≤ v(P )
by Proposition II.1.
Proof of Lemma II.2. If x∗ is optimal to (PPλ), then v(PPλ) = f (x∗)+λα(x∗). Since g (x∗) ≤ 0,
h(x∗)= 0, and x∗ ∈X , x∗ is also feasible for (P ). Then α(x∗)= 0 and f (x∗)≥ v(P ). So v(PPλ)=
f (x∗). Then f (x∗)≤ v(P ) since v(PPλ)≤ v(P ) by Proposition II.1. It follows that f (x∗)= v(P ).
Proof of Proposition II.2. Since by assumption f (x), g (x), and h(x) are bounded and
real-valued functions, (P ) is also bounded. And since X is finite, there exists an x∗ ∈X , such
that α(x∗) = 0, and x∗ is optimal to (P ). It remains to show that there exists λ¯ ≥ 0 such that
x∗ ∈Sλ for all λ≥ λ¯.
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Define Y := {x ∈Rn |α(x)= 0} and let Y c := {x ∈Rn |α(x)> 0} be the complement of Y .
We haveY ∪Y c =Rn ⊃X = (X ∩Y )∪ (X ∩Y c ), and x∗ ∈X ∩Y .
v(PPλ)=min
x∈X
{
f (x)+λα(x)}
=min
{
min
x∈(X∩Y )
{
f (x)+λα(x)} , min
x∈(X∩Y c )
{
f (x)+λα(x)}}
=min
{
min
x∈(X∩Y )
f (x), min
x∈(X∩Y c )
{
f (x)+λα(x)}}
=min
{
f (x∗), min
x∈(X∩Y c )
{
f (x)+λα(x)}}
=min
{
f (x∗), min
x∈X ,α(x)>0
{
f (x)+λα(x)}}.
Let λ0 =maxx∈X ,α(x)>0[ f (x∗)− f (x)]/α(x) ∈ R. SinceX is finite, f , g , and h are bounded,
and α(x) > 0, λ0 exists and is bounded. And α(x) > 0 implies that x is infeasible for (P ). Thus,
the sign of f (x∗)− f (x) is indefinite, as is the sign of λ0. Choose λ¯ =max{λ0,0}. Thus, λ¯ is also
bounded, λ¯≥λ0, and λ¯≥ 0.
For any λ ≥ λ¯, let x¯λ = argminx∈X ,α(x)>0
{
f (x)+λα(x)}. We see that x¯λ exists, since X is
finite and nonempty, f , g , and h are bounded. Also notice that α(x¯λ)> 0.
Since λ0 =maxx∈X ,α(x)>0[ f (x∗)− f (x)]/α(x) and x¯λ ∈ { x ∈X |α(x)> 0}, it follows that λ0 ≥
[ f (x∗)− f (x¯λ)]/α(x¯λ).
Combining the above results, we have λ≥ λ¯≥λ0.
For any x ∈X such that α(x)> 0, we have
f (x)+λα(x)≥ f (x¯λ)+λα(x¯λ)
≥ f (x¯λ)+ λ¯α(x¯λ)
≥ f (x¯λ)+λ0α(x¯λ)
≥ f (x¯λ)+
f (x∗)− f (x¯λ)
α(x¯λ)
·α(x¯λ)
= f (x∗).
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That is, minx∈X ,α(x)>0
{
f (x)+λα(x)}≥ f (x∗).1 Therefore,
v(PPλ)=min
{
f (x∗), min
x∈X ,α(x)>0
{
f (x)+λα(x)}}
= f (x∗).
Since x∗ ∈X , x∗ is feasible for (PPλ). The above result implies that x∗ is optimal to (PPλ); that
is, x∗ ∈Sλ. The proof is completed.
Proof of Proposition II.3. The result follows from Lemma II.2.
Proof of Proposition II.4. The result follows from Proposition II.2.
1Since x∗ ∉ { x ∈X |α(x)> 0}, we cannot simply conclude that minx∈X ,α(x)>0
{
f (x)+λα(x)}= f (x∗).
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF STATEMENTS, CHAPTER III
Proof of Lemma III.1. Consider a special case in which θ = 1. Then
m1 = pr e
3rτ
τ (erτ−2)(erτ−1)(erτ+1) .
For m1 > 0, we must have erτ > 2, or rτ > ln2. The optimal release interval, τ∗, must satisfy
rτ∗ > ln2.
Proof of Lemma III.2. (i) By the general expression of mk in (III.11), mk >mk+1, k ≥ 1, if and
only if ke2rτ+ e(k+2)rτ−k − erτ−2 > 0. Since ke2rτ− erτ = erτ (kerτ−1) > 0 for k ≥ 1 and
rτ > 0, it reduces to show that e(k+2)rτ− (k +2) > 0, or equivalently rτ > ln(k +2)/(k +2),
k ≥ 1. We know that f (k) := ln(k+2)k+2 is strictly decreasing in k when k ≥ 1. Hence, we only
need rτ> ln33 . But by Lemma III.1, rτ> ln2, hence we must have mk >mk+1 for k ≥ 1.
(ii) From the expression of mk in (III.11), it is easy to see that, for a given price p, the numerator
of mk is finite, while the denominator of mk approaches ∞ as k →∞. Therefore, mk → 0
as k →∞.
Proof of Lemma III.3. Solving the firm’s profit maximization problem for general θ, we have
p = M
2r 2
· F1 ·F2
F3
,
99
where
F1 := (1+θrτ)e3rτ−e(θ+2)rτ−2rτe2rτ− rτerτ+2rτ,
F2 := [1+ (θ+1)rτ]e5rτ−e(θ+4)rτ− rτe4rτ−3rτe3rτ−2rτe2rτ+ rτerτ+3rτ,
F3 := [1+ (θ+1)rτ]e8rτ−e(θ+7)rτ−2rτe7rτ−3rτe6rτ+3rτe4rτ.
Substituting the preceding p into the expressions of m1 and m2 obtained from (III.11), we see
that m1 and m2 are functions of rτ and θ only. But we know that, for a given θ, rτ= constant. So
m1 and m2 are also constant. The proof is completed.
Proof of Propositions III.1 and III.2. In order to maximize Πˆ, set
p =
∫ τ
θτ
(mt )e−r (t−θτ)d t +
∫ (1+θ)τ
τ
(mτ)e−r (t−θτ)d t
= m
[
1+θrτ−e−(1−θ)rτ− rτe−rτ]
r 2
. (B.1)
Substituting p from (B.1) into (III.1), we have
Πˆ= m
[
(1+θrτ)e(1−θ)rτ− rτe−θrτ−1]
r 2 (erτ−1) . (B.2)
Since m > 0, r > 0, and τ> 0, the first order condition reduces to
erτ
[(
1+θ2)rτ−2]+e(1+θ)rτ−θ2rτe2rτ−θrτ+1= 0. (B.3)
Let x := rτ, and f (x) := ex [(1+θ2)x−2]+ e(1+θ)x −θ2xe2x −θx + 1 = 0. Assume that θ takes a
finite number of values in (0,1]. Then for each fixed θ, we can numerically find an x∗ = c(θ),
where c(θ) is a constant, such that f (x∗) = 0, and the second order condition is also satisfied.
Thus, x∗ = r τˆ∗ = c(θ) is a profit maximizer, and the firm’s optimal release interval, τˆ∗ = c(θ)/r .
This proves Proposition III.1.
Substituting τˆ∗ into (B.1) and (B.2) proves Proposition III.2.
100
Proof of Propositions III.3 and III.4. In order to maximize Π˚, set
p =
∫ τ
0
(mτ)e−r t d t = mτ (1−e
−rτ)
r
. (B.4)
Plugging p into (III.5), we have
Π˚= mτ
r erτ
. (B.5)
First order condition gives
∂Π˚
∂τ
= m(1− rτ)
r erτ
= 0.
Since m,r,τ> 0, we have 1− rτ= 0. Therefore, τ˚∗ = 1/r .
Check second order condition:
∂2Π˚
∂τ2
= m(rτ−2)
erτ
=−m
e
< 0.
Therefore, τ˚∗ = 1/r is the optimal release interval. Plugging τ˚∗ into (B.4) and (B.5), we
obtain the desired optimal price and optimal profit.
Proof of Proposition III.5. In order to maximize Π˜, set
p =
∫ τ
0
(mt )e−r t d t = m
r 2
(
1− 1+ rτ
erτ
)
. (B.6)
Substituting p from (B.6) into (III.9), we get
Π˜= m
r 2
(
1− rτ
erτ−1
)
(B.7)
It can be seen that Π˜ is monotonically increasing in τ . As τ→∞, we have p →m/r 2, and Πc →
m/r 2. Since in the model, we assume that consumers are infinitely lived, τ→∞ implies that the
firm charges consumers up-front m/r 2 for a lifetime. This proves parts (i) and (ii). To see that
part (iii) also holds, notice that all the value accrued by the consumers is equal to the NPV of the
area of the infinite triangle formed by the nonnegative time axis and the technology innovation
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trajectory. Thus, all the value accrued by the consumers is equal to
∫∞
0 (mt )e
−r t d t =m/r 2, which
proves part (iii).
Proof of Proposition III.6. Substituting τ= τ˚∗ = 1/r into (B.7), we have
Π˜ |τ=τ˚∗ =
(e−2)m
(e−1)r 2 ≈ 0.42
m
r 2
= 42%V.
By Proposition III.4,
Π˚ |τ=τ˚∗ =
m
er 2
≈ 0.37 m
r 2
= 37%V.
Thus, Π˜ |τ=τ˚∗ > Π˚ |τ=τ˚∗ .
Proof of Proposition III.7. By (B.5) and (B.7), Π˜ = Π˚ reduces to erτ+ rτe−rτ− 2rτ− 1 = 0. Let
x := rτ, and f (x) := ex+xe−x−2x−1= 0. Observe that f (x) is a continuous function with f (0.5)≈
−0.05 < 0 and f (1) ≈ 0.09 > 0. By Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists an x¯ ∈ (0.5,1) such
that f (x¯) = 0. Solving f (x) = 0 numerically, we get x¯ ≈ 0.84. That is, r¯τ ≈ 0.84 or r¯ ≈ 0.84/τ.
Plotting (r¯ ,τ) gives us an indifference curve at which the continuous- and no-updates policies
yield equal profits. This proves parts (i) and (ii). To prove part (iii), notice that Π˜ > Π˚ reduces
to f (x) > 0. Solving f (x) > 0 numerically, we get x > 0.84. That is, rτ > 0.84 or r > r¯ ≈ 0.84/τ.
Similarly, we can show that if r < r¯ , Π˚> Π˜.
Proof of Proposition III.8. (i) Per Proof of Proposition III.5, V corresponds to the maximum
profit that the firm gets under the continuous-updates policy. V is also equal to the area of the
infinite triangle formed by the nonnegative time axis and the technology innovation trajectory.
By contrast, the profits that the firm gets under partial- and no-updates policies are equal to the
infinite sum of the areas of the shaded regions shown in Figures III.1 and III.3, respectively. It is
obvious that the area of the infinite triangle is greater than the areas of the shaded regions in
Figures III.1 and III.3.
(ii) By Propositions III.2 and III.4,
Πˆ∗− Π˚∗ = m
r 2
[
(1+θr τˆ∗)e(1−θ)r τˆ∗ − r τˆ∗e−θr τˆ∗ −1
er τˆ∗ −1 −
1
e
]
. (B.8)
102
From Proposition III.1, we know that, for a given θ, r τˆ∗ = c(θ)= constant. Therefore, for a given
θ, we can substitute the corresponding r τˆ∗ into (B.8), and check whether Πˆ∗−Π˚∗ is positive. For
example, for θ = 0.3, r τˆ∗ = 2.55 and Πˆ∗− Π˚∗ = 0.34m/r 2 > 0. Following the same logic, we can
show that, for any given θ ∈ (0,1), Πˆ∗− Π˚∗ > 0.
Proof of Proposition III.9. By Proposition III.1 and V =m/r 2, we have
Πˆ∗
V
= (1+θrτ
∗)e(1−θ)rτ
∗ − rτ∗e−θrτ∗ −1
erτ∗ −1 . (B.9)
Observe that r and τ∗ always go together in (B.9). By Proposition III.1, for a given θ, rτ∗ =
constant. It follows that, for a given θ, Πˆ∗/V = constant.
Proof of Proposition III.10. By equating (III.19) and (III.20), we have
e−3rτ
∗ (
erτ
∗ −2)(erτ∗ −1)(erτ∗ +1)
2
= rτ
∗e−2rτ
∗ (
erτ
∗ −1)(erτ∗ −e2rτ∗ +2)2
−6rτ∗−erτ∗ +e2rτ∗(rτ∗−2)+e3rτ∗(rτ∗+1)+2 . (B.10)
Observe that r and τ∗ always come together in the proceeding equation. Let x := rτ∗. From
(B.10), we have
f (x)= e
−3x (ex −2)(ex −1)(ex +1)
2
− xe
−2x (ex −1)(ex −e2x +2)2
−6x−ex +e2x (x−2)+e3x (x+1)+2
= 0. (B.11)
By Lemma III.1, rτ∗ > ln2; that is, x > ln2. For x ∈ (ln2,∞), f (x) is a continuous function
with f (1)≈ 0.05> 0 and f (2)≈−0.04< 0. By Intermediate Value Theorem, there is an x∗ ∈ (1,2)
such that f (x∗) = 0. If we solve (B.11) numerically, we get x∗ ≈ 1.71. That is, rτ∗ = constant ≈
1.71.
Proof of Proposition III.11. The proof is similar to that of Proposition III.10.
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Proof of Proposition III.12. Notice that
∞∑
n=1
e−r (n−1+θ)τ = e
(1−θ)rτ
erτ−1 ,
∞∑
n=1
e−r (2n−1+θ)τ = e
(1−θ)rτ
e2rτ−1 ,
...
∞∑
n=1
e−r (kn−1+θ)τ = e
(1−θ)rτ
eN rτ−1 ,
and for r > 0, τ> 0, 0< θ ≤ 1,
e(1−θ)rτ
erτ−1 >
e(1−θ)rτ
e2rτ−1 > ·· · >
e(1−θ)rτ
eN rτ−1 ,
we have
∞∑
n=1
e−r (n−1+θ)τ >
∞∑
n=1
e−r (2n−1+θ)τ > ·· · >
∞∑
n=1
e−r (kn−1+θ)τ.
Also notice that
M >m1 >m2 > ·· · >mk−1 >mk > ·· · >mN−1 > 0.
Hence, an upper bound on ΠN is given by
ΠUN (p,τ) := (M −m1)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (n−1+θ)τ+ (m1−m2)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (2n−1+θ)τ
+ (m2−m3)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (2n−1+θ)τ+ (m3−m4)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (2n−1+θ)τ
+·· ·+ (mk−1−mk )φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (2n−1+θ)τ
+·· ·+ (mN−1−0)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (2n−1+θ)τ
= (M −m1)φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (n−1+θ)τ+m1φ
∞∑
n=1
pe−r (2n−1+θ)τ
= (M −m1)φp e
(1−θ)rτ
erτ−1 +m1φp
e(1−θ)rτ
e2rτ−1 .
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APPENDIX C
STATISTICAL PROPERTIES, CHAPTER IV
To derive the statistical properties of {D t }, we start with the moment properties of the
process {²t }. First, we note that ²t can be written as an ARMA(1,1) model
²t =ω+ (α+β)²t−1−βζt−1+ζt , (C.1)
where ζt := ²t −ψt is a martingale difference (namely, its expectation with respect to past values
of ²t and ζt is zero). We then apply the results of ARMA processes and obtain the explicit
expressions for the moments of ²t , which are given in Lemma C.1.
Lemma C.1.
(a) E[²t ]= ω
1−α−β , (C.2)
(b) Var[²t ]=
(
ω
1−α−β
)2 1−2αβ−β2
1−2αβ−2α2−β2 , (C.3)
(c) Cov[²t ,²t+1]=
(
ω
1−α−β
)2 α(1−αβ−β2)
1−2αβ−2α2−β2 , (C.4)
(d) Cov[²t ,²t+i ]= (α+β)i−1 Cov[²t ,²t+1] for i > 1. (C.5)
It is worthwhile to mention that if both α and β are zero, ²t becomes an i.i.d. sequence of
random variables following an exponential distribution with E[ηt ] = ω. In this case,
heteroscedasticity is absent and we have a homogeneous demand D t . Whenever α+β > 0, the
demand exhibits heteroscedasticity. The next lemma shows that the magnitude of its
heteroscedasticity depends intimately on the parameters ω, α, and β.
Lemma C.2. Var[²t ] is strictly increasing in ω, α, and β.
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Having obtained the statistical properties of ²t , we are ready to derive the explicit
expressions of the moments of the demand process D t , which exhibits both autocorrelations
and heteroscedasticity. The results are summarized in Lemma C.3 and Lemma C.4.
Lemma C.3.
(a) E[D t ]= 1
1−ρ
(
µ+ ω
1−α−β
)
, (C.6)
(b) Var[D t ]=
ω2
[
α
(
ρ+ρβ2−2β)+ (1−β2)(1−ρβ)](
1−ρ2)(1−α−β)2 (1−2αβ−2α2−β2)[1−ρ (α+β)] , (C.7)
(c) Cov[D t ,D t+1]=
ρω2
[
ρ+αβ(ρβ−2)+ (1−β2)(1−ρβ)](
1−ρ2)(1−α−β)2 (1−2αβ−2α2−β2)[1−ρ (α+β)] , (C.8)
(d) Cov[D t ,D t+i ]= ρi−1 Cov[D t ,D t+1] for i > 1. (C.9)
Lemma C.4. Var[D t ] is strictly increasing in ρ, ω, α, and β.
Lemma C.4 suggests that the variance of D t depends not only on the strength of the
demand autocorrelation but also on the magnitude of the heteroscedasticity. Previous literature
showed that the presence of the autocorrelation in the demand process will increase the
variances of both retailer’s and manufacturer’s orders. As we shall see later, stronger
heteroscedasticity in the demand process can also lead to higher variances of both retailer’s and
manufacturer’s orders, even when the demand process is not autocorrelated.
Note that in deriving the statistical properties of {²t } and {D t }, the following regularity
condition is required: ω> 0, α≥ 0, β≥ 0, β= 0 if α= 0, and 2α2+2αβ+β2 < 1.
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APPENDIX D
PROOFS OF STATEMENTS, CHAPTER IV
Proof of Lemma IV.1. First define the notation
ξi :=
i∑
k=0
ρk = 1−ρ
i+1
1−ρ .
The total demand over the retailer’s lead time,At , can be written as
At :=
l+1∑
i=1
D t+i
= 1
1−ρ
[
µ
l+1∑
i=1
(
1−ρi
)
+ρ
(
1−ρl+1
)
D t
]
+
l∑
i=0
(
i∑
k=0
ρk
)
²t+l+1−i
= µ
(
ρl+2−ρl −2ρ+ l +1)
(1−ρ)2 +
ρ
(
1−ρl+1)
1−ρ D t +
l∑
i=0
ξi ²t+l+1−i . (D.1)
Combining (D.1) with the results in Lemma C.3, we find that given D t , D t−1, . . . , the
conditional expectation ofAt is
mt := E[At |D t ,D t−1, . . . ]
= µ
(
ρl+2−ρl −2ρ+ l +1)
(1−ρ)2 +
ρ
(
1−ρl+1)
1−ρ D t +
l∑
i=0
ξi E[²t ]
= µ
(
ρl+2−ρl −2ρ+ l +1)
(1−ρ)2 +
ρ
(
1−ρl+1)
1−ρ D t +
ω
1−α−β
l+1∑
i=1
1−ρi
1−ρ ,
=
(
ρl+2−ρl −2ρ+ l +1)[ω+µ(1−α−β)]
(1−ρ)2(1−α−β) +
ρ
(
1−ρl+1)
1−ρ D t ,
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and the conditional variance ofAt is given by
vt :=Var[At |D t ,D t−1, . . . ]
=Var
[ l∑
i=0
ξi ²t+l+1−i
]
=Var
[l+1∑
i=1
ξl+1−i ²t+i
]
=
l+1∑
i=1
(ξl+1−i )2 Var[²t+i ]+2
l∑
i=1
l+1∑
j=i+1
ξl+1−iξl+1− j Cov[²t+i ,²t+ j ]
=
l+1∑
i=1
(
1−ρl+2−i
1−ρ
)2
Var[²t+i ]+2
l∑
i=1
l+1∑
j=i+1
1−ρl+2−i
1−ρ
1−ρl+2− j
1−ρ Cov[²t+i ,²t+ j ]
=Var[²t ]
l+1∑
i=1
(
1−ρl+2−i
1−ρ
)2
+2 Cov[²t ,²t+1]
l∑
i=1
l+1∑
j=i+1
1−ρl+2−i
1−ρ
1−ρl+2− j
1−ρ
(
α+β) j−i−1 .
Proof of Lemma IV.2. Using (IV.9), we have
B′t :=
L+1∑
i=1
Yt+i
=
L+1∑
i=1
[
D t+i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ (D t+i −D t+i−1)
]
=
L+1∑
i=1
D t+i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ
L+1∑
i=1
D t+i − ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ
L+1∑
i=1
D t+i−1
=
(
1+ ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ
)
L+1∑
i=1
D t+i − ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ
(
L+1∑
i=1
D t+i +D t −D t+L+1
)
=
L+1∑
i=1
D t+i − ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ (D t −D t+L+1) . (D.2)
From (D.1), we have
L+1∑
i=1
D t+i =
µ
(
ρL+2−ρL−2ρ+L+1)
(1−ρ)2 +
ρ−ρL+2
1−ρ D t +
L∑
i=0
ξi ²t+L+1−i . (D.3)
Expanding D t+L+1, we have
D t+L+1 =
µ
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ +ρ
L+1D t +
L+1∑
i=1
ρL+1−i ²t+i . (D.4)
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Combining (D.2), (D.3), and (D.4), we can rewriteB′t as
B′t =
µ
(
ρL+l+3−ρl+2−ρL−ρ+L+1)
(1−ρ)2 +
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ D t
+
L+1∑
i=1
[
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
]
²t+i . (D.5)
Given Yt , Yt−1, . . . , and D t , D t−1, . . . , the conditional expectation ofB′t can be written as
M ′t = E[B′t |Yt ,Yt−1, . . . ,D t ,D t−1, . . . ]
= µ
(
ρL+l+3−ρl+2−ρL−ρ+L+1)
(1−ρ)2 +
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ D t
+ ω
1−α−β
L+1∑
i=1
[
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
]
=
[
ρl+2
(
ρL+1−1)+ (1−ρ)(L+1)][(ω+µ(1−α−β)]
(1−ρ)2(1−α−β) +
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ D t ,
and the conditional variance ofB′t is given by
V ′t = Var[B′t |Yt ,Yt−1, . . . ,D t ,D t−1, . . . ]
= Var
[
L+1∑
i=1
(
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
)
²t+i
]
=
L+1∑
i=1
(
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
)2
Var[²t+i ]
+2
L∑
i=1
L+1∑
j=i+1
(
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
)(
ξL+1− j + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1− j
)
Cov[²t+i ,²t+ j ].
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Proof of Lemma IV.3. Substituting D t from (IV.15) into (D.5), we get
Bt :=
L+1∑
i=1
Yt+i
= µ
(
ρL+l+3−ρl+2−ρL−ρ+L+1)
(1−ρ)2
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρ
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)t
D0
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρl+2
t−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i
+
L+1∑
i=1
(
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
)
²t+i .
Mt and Vt are given by
Mt := E[Bt |Yt ,Yt−1, . . . ,Y1]
=
[
ρl+2
(
ρL+1−1)+ (1−ρ)(L+1)][(ω+µ(1−α−β)]
(1−ρ)2(1−α−β)
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
(1−ρ)2
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)t (
µ+ ω
1−α−β
)
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρl+2
t−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i ,
and
Vt := Var[Bt |Yt ,Yt−1, . . . ,Y1]
= Var
[
L+1∑
i=1
(
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
)
²t+i
]
=V ′t .
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Proof of Lemma IV.4. Let B˜t be the retailer’s demand over the manufacturer’s lead time in this
scenario. Substituting D t from (IV.19) into (D.5), we have
B˜t :=
L+1∑
i=1
Yt+i
= µ
(
ρL+l+3−ρl+2−ρL−ρ+L+1)
(1−ρ)2
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρ
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)q
D t−q
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρl+2
q−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i
+
L+1∑
i=1
[
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
]
²t+i . (D.6)
Let M˜t and V˜t be the conditional expectation and the conditional variance of B˜t when
there is no demand information sharing and only the most recent q orders are used to forecast
the demand, respectively. M˜t and V˜t are given by
M˜t := E[Bt |Yt , . . . ,Yt−q+1]
=
[
ρl+2
(
ρL+1−1)+ (1−ρ)(L+1)][(ω+µ(1−α−β)]
(1−ρ)2(1−α−β)
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
(1−ρ)2
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)q (
µ+ ω
1−α−β
)
+ ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρl+2
q−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i ,
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and
V˜t := Var[Bt |Yt , . . . ,Yt−q+1]
=
[
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)q]2
Var[D t−q ]
+Var
[
L+1∑
i=1
(
ξL+1−i + ρ−ρ
l+2
1−ρ ρ
L+1−i
)
²t+i
]
=
[
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)q]2
Var[D t ]+V ′t .
Proof of Lemma C.1. We first show that ζt := ²t −ψt is a martingale difference. At time t −1, the
conditional first moment of E[ζt ] = E[²t −ψt ] = E[ψtηt ]−E[ψt ] = E[ψt ](E[ηt ]−1), which is zero
because E[ηt ] = 1. Applying the results of ARMA processes to (4), it is straightforward to verify
that the results in Lemma 1 hold.
Proof of Lemma C.2. Rewrite Var[²t ] as
Var[²t ]=
(
ω
1−α−β
)2 1
1− 2α21−2αβ−β2
.
The fact that both terms in the above product are monotonic increasing functions of ω, α and β
proves the desired result.
Proof of Lemma C.3. Using the recursive relationship of (IV.1), we can write D t as
D t = µ
1−ρ +
∞∑
j=0
ρ j ²t− j . (D.7)
It follows that
E[D t ]= 1
1−ρ
(
µ+ ω
1−α−β
)
,
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which proves part (a), and
Var[D t ]=Var
[ ∞∑
j=0
ρ j ²t− j
]
=
∞∑
j=0
ρ2 j Var[²t− j ]+2
∞∑
j ,k: j<k
ρ jρk Cov[²t− j ,²t−k ]
= Var[²t ]
1−ρ2 +2Cov[²t ,²t+1]
∞∑
j ,k: j<k
ρ j+k
(
α+β)k− j−1 ,
which converges as k →∞. To see this, let
S∞ :=
∞∑
j ,k: j<k
ρ j+k
(
α+β)k− j−1 = ∞∑
j ,k: j<k
ρ j+kδk− j−1,
where δ :=α+β.
We first derive
SN :=
N∑
j ,k: j<k
ρNδk− j−1 =
N∑
i=1
ai ,
where a1 = ρ, ai = ρδai−1+ρ2i−1 for i > 1. Thus,
SN =
N∑
i=1
ai = ρδ (a1+a2+·· ·+aN−1)+
(
ρ+ρ3+·· ·+ρ2N−1)
= ρδ (SN −aN )+
ρ
(
1−ρ2N )
1−ρ2 . (D.8)
We still need to derive aN . From the recursive relationship of aN , aN can be expanded into
aN = ρNδN−1+ρN+1δN−2+·· ·+ρ2N−1δ0 =
ρNδN−1
[
1− (ρ/δ)N]
δ−ρ .
Substituting aN from the above equation into (D.8), we have
SN =
ρ
(
1−ρ2N )(
1−ρ2) (1−ρδ) − ρ
N+1δ
(
δN −ρN )
(δ−ρ)(1−ρδ) .
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We require that 0< ρ < 1, and 0< δ< 1. Now it is obvious that
lim
N→∞
SN = ρ(
1−ρ2) (1−ρδ) .
Therefore,
S∞ = ρ(
1−ρ2)[1−ρ (α+β)] . (D.9)
Finally, using the results from (C.3), (C.5), and (D.9), we have an explicit expression of the
variance of D t :
Var[D t ]= Var[²t ]
1−ρ2 +2Cov[²t ,²t+1]S∞
= ω
2
[
α
(
ρ+ρβ2−2β)+ (1−β2)(1−ρβ)](
1−ρ2)(1−α−β)2 (1−2αβ−2α2−β2)[1−ρ (α+β)] ,
which proves part (b).
We derive Cov[D t ,D t+i ] by noting that from (D.7), we have
Cov[D t ,D t+i ]=Cov
[
µ
1−ρ +
∞∑
j=0
ρ j ²t− j ,
µ
1−ρ +
∞∑
j=0
ρ j ²t+i− j
]
=Cov
[ ∞∑
j=0
ρ j ²t− j ,
∞∑
k=0
ρk²t−(k−i )
]
=
∞∑
j ,k: j=k−i
ρ j+k Cov[² j ,²k−i ]+2
∞∑
j ,k: j<k−i
ρ j+k Cov[² j ,²k−i ]
=Var[²t ]
∞∑
j=0
ρ2 j+i +2Cov[²t ,²t+1]
∞∑
j ,k: j<k−i
ρ j+k
(
α+β)k−i− j−1
=Var[²t ] ρ
i
1−ρ2 +2Cov[²t ,²t+1]R∞, (D.10)
where
R∞ :=
∞∑
j ,k: j<k−i
ρ j+k
(
α+β)k−i− j−1 .
Let
R˜∞ := ρ−i R∞ =
∞∑
j ,k: j<k−i
ρ j+k
(
α+β)k−i− j−1 .
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Comparing R˜∞ with S∞, we have R˜∞ = S∞. Therefore, we get the explicit expression of
autocovariance function of D t :
Cov[D t ,D t+i ]=Var[²t ] ρ
i
1−ρ2 +2Cov[²t ,²t+1]ρ
i S∞
= ρ
iω2
[
ρ+αβ(ρβ−2)+ (1−β2)(1−ρβ)](
1−ρ2)(1−α−β)2 (1−2αβ−2α2−β2)[1−ρ (α+β)] . (D.11)
It follows that parts (c) and (d) hold.
Proof of Lemma C.4. (a) From the proof of Lemma C.3, we have
Var[D t ]= Var[²t ]
1−ρ2 +
2ρCov[²t ,²t+1](
1−ρ2)[1−ρ (α+β)] .
Since Var[D t ] and Cov[²t ,²t+1] are positive and independent of ρ, 0< ρ < 1, and 0≤α+β<
1, it follows that Var[D t ] is strictly increasing in ρ.
(b) It is obvious from (C.7) that Var[D t ] is strictly increasing ω.
(c) Var[D t ] can be rewritten as
Var[D t ]=
(
ω
1−α−β
)2 1
1− 2α21−2αβ−β2
1
1−ρ2
+ 2αω
2(
1−α−β)2 11− αβ+2α21−αβ−β2
ρ(
1−ρ2)[1−ρ (α+β)] . (D.12)
Now it is easy to see that Var[D t ] is strictly increasing in α.
(d) It is also easy to see from (D.12) that Var[D t ] is strictly increasing in β.
Proof of Proposition IV.1. (a) By the regularity condition, α+β > 0 implies that α > 0 and
β ≥ 0. By Lemma C.2, for given ω > 0, 0 < Var[²t ] |α=β=0 < Var[²t ] |α+β>0. For 0 ≤ ρ < 1,
l ≥ 0,α> 0, and β≥ 0,∑l+1i=1 [(1−ρl+2−i )/(1−ρ)]2 > 0 and independent ofα and β, and the
second term in (IV.5) is nonnegative. It follows that vt |α=β=0 < vt |α+β>0.
115
(b) For given 0≤ ρ < 1 and l ≥ 0, ∑l+1i=1 [(1−ρl+2−i )/(1−ρ)]2 > 0 and independent of α and β,
and the second term in (IV.5) are nonnegative. The result follows since Var[²t ] is positive
and remains constant in both cases. The equality holds if and only if l = 0.
Proof of Proposition IV.2. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition IV.1.
Proof of Proposition IV.3. We first show that M ′t =Mt .
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρ D t
= ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρ
[
1−ρ
1−ρl+2
t−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i +
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)t
D0
]
by (IV.14)
= ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρ
[
1−ρ
1−ρl+2
t−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i +
(
−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)t
1
1−ρ
(
µ+ ω
1−α−β
)]
= ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρl+2
t−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i +
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
(1−ρ)2
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)t (
µ+ ω
1−α−β
)
.
With the above result, we conclude that M ′t =Mt by comparing (IV.10) with (IV.16). It turns
out that T ′t = Tt by (IV.13), (IV.17) and (IV.18).
Remark D.1. In the proof of Proposition IV.3, we use the result
D0 = E[D t ]= 1
1−ρ
(
µ+ ω
1−α−β
)
,
because by assumption, both the manufacturer and the retailer know the parameters of the
underlying demand process, although in the no-information-sharing case, the retailer chooses
not to share the information about the actual realization of the demand with the manufacturer.
Proof of Proposition IV.4. By the regularity condition, α+β> 0 implies that α> 0 and β≥ 0. By
Proposition IV.2, for given ω> 0, 0≤ ρ < 1, l ≥ 0, and L ≥ 0, V ′t |α=β=0 <V ′t |α+β>0. By Lemma C.4,
Var[D t ] is strictly increasing in α and β. It follows from (IV.11) that, for given ω > 0, 0 ≤ ρ < 1,
l ≥ 0, L ≥ 0, and q ≥ 1, we have V˜t |α=β=0 < V˜t |α+β>0.
Proof of Proposition IV.5. The proof follows directly from (IV.17).
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Proof of Proposition IV.6. (a) The proof follows from (IV.21) since Var[D t ]> 0 and ρ 6= 0.
(b) If ρ = 0, then λ= 0. It follows from (IV.21) that V˜t =V ′t . Let W˜t be the manufacturer’s order
in period t . Then we have
W˜t = Yt + T˜t − T˜t−1 = Yt + M˜t − M˜t−1
= Yt +
ρl+2
(
1−ρL+1)
1−ρl+2
q−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−i
− ρ
l+2 (1−ρL+1)
1−ρl+2
q−1∑
i=0
(
ρ−ρl+2
1−ρl+2
)i
Yt−1−i .
Thus, W˜t = Yt if ρ = 0.
Before we prove Proposition IV.7, we first introduce the following lemma about λ.
Lemma D.1. For 0< ρ < 1, l ≥ 0, L ≥ 0, and q ≥ 1,
(a) λ is strictly increasing in ρ;
(b) λ is strictly increasing in L;
(c) λ is strictly decreasing in q;
(d) λ has no simple monotonic relationship with l .
Proof of Lemma D.1. (a) 0 < ρ < 1 ⇒ λ > 0. Since ∂ ln(λ)/∂ρ = (1/λ)∂λ/∂ρ,
∂λ/∂ρ > 0⇔ ∂ ln(λ)/∂ρ > 0. We proceed by calculating ∂ ln(λ)/∂ρ and checking if
∂ ln(λ)
∂ρ
= 2
{
1
ρ
[
(l +1)q
ρl+1−1 −
(l +2)q
ρl+2−1 + l +2
]
+ (L+1)ρ
L
ρL+1−1 +
1
1−ρ
}
> 0,
which is reduced to show
(l +2)q
1−ρl+2 −
(l +1)q
1−ρl+1 + l +2>
(L+1)ρL+1
1−ρL+1 −
ρ
1−ρ . (D.13)
We have the following two results for the LHS and RHS of (D.13): (i) For 0< ρ < 1, and x ≥ 1,
x/(1−ρx )> x, hence x/(1−ρx ) is increasing in x. So (l+2)q/(1−ρl+2)−(l+1)q/(1−ρl+1)> 0.
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And since l ≥ 0, we have LHS> 0; (ii) For 0< ρ < 1, and y ≥ 1, yρy /(1−ρy )= y/[(1/ρ)y −1].
Hence yρy /(1−ρy ) is decreasing in y . Therefore, RHS≤ 0, with “=” if L = 0. With these two
results, it follows that (D.13) holds.
(b) It is obvious since 0< ρ < 1.
(c) For 0 < ρ < 1 and l ≥ 0, we have 0 < ρl+2 < ρl+1 < 1, so 0 < 1−ρl+1 < 1−ρl+2. Hence
0< (1−ρl+1)/(1−ρl+2)< 1. We then have 0< ρ(1−ρl+1)/(1−ρl+2)< ρ. So 0< (ρ−ρl+2)/(1−
ρl+2)< ρ < 1. Then it follows that λ is strictly increasing in q for q ≥ 1.
(d) Since ∂ ln(λ)/∂l = (1/λ)∂λ/∂l and λ > 0, ∂λ/∂l > 0 ⇔ ∂ ln(λ)/∂l > 0. Taking partial
derivative of ln(λ) with respect to l yields
∂ ln(λ)
∂l
= 2
[
1+q
(
1
1−ρl+2 −
1
1−ρl+1
)]
ln(ρ).
For 0 < ρ < 1 and l ≥ 0, we have 1/(1−ρl+2)−1/(1−ρl+1) < 0, and ln(ρ) < 0. The sign of
∂ ln(λ)/∂l is dependent on the sign of γ := 1+q [1/(1−ρl+2)−1/(1−ρl+1)].
Proof of Proposition IV.7. The proof is straightforward from Lemmas C.4 and D.1.
Proof of Corollary IV.1. By the regularity condition stated in Appendix C, α+β> 0 implies that
α> 0 and β≥ 0. The result holds by part (a) of Proposition IV.7.
Proof of Proposition IV.8. Since ρl+2(1 − ρL+1)/(1 − ρ) and Var[D t ] are finite, and
0< (ρ−ρl+2)/(1−ρl+2)< 1 from the proof of Lemma D.1, it follows that λ→ 0 as q →∞. Thus,
∆=λVar[D t ]→ 0 as q →∞.
Proof of Proposition IV.9. ∆ = λVar[D t ] can be written as ∆ = ω2g (l ,L, q,ρ,α,β). From (IV.11),
V ′t can be written as V
′
t = ω2 f (l ,L,ρ,α,β). Thus, φ = ∆/V˜t = ∆/(V ′t +∆) = ω2g /(ω2 f +ω2g ) =
g /( f + g ), which is independent of ω. φ can be rewritten as φ = 1/(V ′t /∆+1). Since ∆ is strictly
decreasing in q , and V ′t is independent of q ,φ is also strictly decreasing in q . By Proposition IV.8,
∆→ 0 as q →∞. It follows that φ→ 0 as q →∞.
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